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THREE ESSAYS ON THE IMPACTS OF RISK AND UNCERTAINTY ON
FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT (FDI) AND REMITTANCES
FLOWS INTO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

Blen Solomon, Ph.D.
Western Michigan University, 2007

This three-essay dissertation focuses on the two most important and most stable
sources o f finance to developing countries, namely Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and
remittances. The first essay examines the roles o f exchange rate uncertainty and
political risk in determining FDI inflows into African economies. The past few decades
have witnessed a surge o f FDI inflows to developing regions. However, FDI inflows to
Africa still remain relatively small and investor surveys show political risk and
macroeconomic uncertainty to be strong deterrents o f FDI inflows into Africa. In this essay,
I use a sample o f 12 African countries and employ Fixed Effect and Arellano-Bond GMM
estimators to investigate the impact of exchange rate uncertainty and political risk on FDI
inflows into African economies. The results confirm the predictions of the theoretical model
presented, showing both macroeconomic uncertainty and political risk to be deterrents of
FDI inflows into these African economies.
The second essay is concerned with the unbalanced FDI inflow patterns across
developing regions. For example, in 2004 Africa received 8% o f total FDI inflows to
developing countries, while Asia and Latin America received 68% and 23%
respectively. In addition to the traditional determinants o f FDI such as infrastructure
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development, market size, and labor force availability; the question o f whether political
risk and exchange rate uncertainty play a role in determining these patterns is addressed.
This essay employs data on FDI inflows into Africa, Asia, and Latin America to
conduct a cross-region comparison on the impacts o f risk and uncertainty on FDI
inflows. Parametric as well as semiparametric results show that risk affects FDI into
Africa more severely than other developing regions. In addition, it is shown that even
after controlling for important FDI determinants, African countries receive less FDI
compared to other developing countries.
The third essay focuses on remittances which are becoming an increasingly
important and highly stable source o f external finance for many developing countries.
The stable and counter-cyclical nature o f remittances exerts a stabilizing influence and
helps insulate vulnerable developing countries from economic shocks. Hence, the third
essay analyzes the effects o f uncertainty and risk in affecting remittances inflows into
these economies. This essay mainly focuses on Latin America since it is now the main
remittance recipient region in the world.
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CHAPTER I

THE ROLES OF EXCHANGE RATE UNCERTAINTY AND POLITICAL RISK ON
FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT INTO AFRICA

1.1 INTRODUCTION, BACKGROUND, AND MOTIVATION

Foreign direct investment (FDI)1 has become a key element o f the global
economy. Because o f its long-term nature, FDI has the potential to generate employment,
raise productivity, transfer skills and technology, enhance exports and contribute to the
long-term economic development o f the world’s developing countries (UNCTAD, 2004).
In addition, FDI is considered less prone to crisis as opposed to short term credits and
portfolio investments, because direct investors, in general, have a long term perspective
when investing in a host country (see Lipsey, 1999). The significant benefits o f FDI over
other types o f capital inflows, has made attracting FDI one o f the integral parts o f
economic development strategies (see Bennassy-Quere et al, 2001 and Prasad et al.,
2003).
Consequently, there is competition among developing countries to attract FDI.
Many developing countries have adopted policies that are favorable to increase FDI
inflows such as removing trade restrictions and providing sound economic policy
environments. Due to these factors, FDI to developing countries has increased. By 2004
the share o f developing countries in world FDI inflows was 36%; the highest level since
1997. However, the same year FDI inflows to Africa remained nearly the same at about

1 The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) defines foreign direct investment
(FDI) as an investment involving a long-term relationship and lasting interest in and control by a resident
entity in one economy in an enterprise resident in another economy. The ownership level required in order
for a direct investment to exist is 10% o f the voting shares (UNCTAD, 2004).

1
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3% o f world FDI inflows while all other regions experienced a significant increase
(WIR , 2005). In general, FDI to African countries still remains small when compared to
other developing regions despite the fact that Africa has the highest rate o f return on
investment when compared to other developing regions (see Harsch, 2005).3
Most countries in Africa are characterized with low domestic savings and do not
have access to international capital markets. In addition, official loans and foreign
assistance per capita to the region have decreased. These important facts have increased
the significance o f FDI to Africa to achieve the Millennium Development Goal (MDG)
o f halving its proportion o f people that live in extreme poverty (i.e. the proportion o f
people whose income is less than $1 a day and the proportion o f people who suffer from
hunger) by 2015.4 FDI can also aid the region to overcome scarcities o f resources such as
capital and entrepreneur skills, facilitate technological transfer and innovation, and create
employment. Due to the paramount significance o f FDI to the region, it is important to
investigate what has deterred FDI inflows to African economies.
What characteristics does Africa exhibit that deter FDI inflows into the region?
Asiedu (2006) reconciles the result o f four investor surveys5 and finds macroeconomic
instability such as exchange rate risk and inflation, as well as political risk arising from
corruption and political instability to be strong deterrents o f FDI inflows into Africa. In
general, when investing in developing economies, investors are mostly concerned with
political and institutional factors as well as exchange rate risks that might affect their
2 World Investment Report, 2005.
3 The average return on U.S FDI to Africa in the 1990’s was about 27% as compared with a return o f 17%
for all developing countries (see Asiedu, 2002; Harsch, 2005; and UNCTAD, 1995).3
4 For more explanation on the MDG see The UN Millennium project, 2001; Hamori and Razafimahefa,
2005; and Asiedu, 2002.
5 These surveys were the World Business Environment Survey (WBES), World Development Report
Survey (WDRS), World Investment Report (WIR) Survey, The Center for Research into Economics and
Finance in Southern Africa (CREFSA) Survey.

2
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investment (Lemi and Asefa, 2003). However, there are very few studies in the literature
that investigate rigorously the impact o f exchange rate uncertainty and political risk6 such
as political instability and host country institutional inefficiencies, for African economies
(for exceptions see Lemi and Asefa, 2003). Therefore, by incorporating measures for
exchange rate uncertainty and political risk, this study examines the role o f uncertainty
and risk in affecting FDI inflows to African economies.
This study contributes to the literature in a few ways. First, we investigate the
joint impacts o f political risk and exchange rate uncertainty on FDI inflows into Africa by
controlling for other factors that are likely to affect FDI inflows into the region.7
Conditional variances o f exchange rates obtained from GARCH models will be used to
measure exchange rate uncertainty. The overall political risk index provided by the
International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) will be used to measure the combined effects
o f political and institutional instabilities faced by FDI investors. In addition, we use
particular measures o f political instability and institutional quality also provided by the
ICRG in order to capture the differential impacts o f political instability and institutional
inefficiency. Also we use the concept o f first degree stochastic dominance to understand
if an improvement in the rate o f return to investment increases the attractiveness o f the
African economies for investment.

6 The concept o f political risk has not received a clear cut definition. However, for the purpose o f this paper
we will use the definition provided by Haendel (1979), who defines political risk as the risk or probability
o f occurrence o f some political event(s) that will change the prospects for the profitability o f a given
investment. Political risk captures political instability and host country institutional inefficiencies.
7 In order to measure political risk, we use the political risk indices provided by the International Country
Risk Guide (ICRG). The ICRG is published by Political Risk Services (PRS) and is used by institutional
investors, banks, multinational corporations, importers, exporters, foreign exchange traders, shipping
concerns, and a multitude o f others, to determine how political risk might affect their business and
investments now and in the future (ICRG, 2006). This dataset has been used by very few studies concerned
with African economies (for exceptions see Asiedu, 2002, 2006).

3
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Moreover, we adopt a simple theoretical model developed by Baniak et al (2005),
to describe the process o f decision-making concerning FDI in a country with an uncertain
exchange rate and political environment. Finally, we test the predictions o f this model
that exchange rate uncertainty as well as political risk deters FDI inflows into African
economies.
The rest o f the paper is organized as follows: section 2 provides background on
FDI and its determinants. Section 3 presents a theoretical background from which we
derive testable predictions about the effects o f uncertainty and risk on FDI inflows.
Section 4 describes the data, while section 5 outlines the empirical methodology. Section
6 discusses the empirical findings and finally, section 7 draws conclusions and policy
implications.

1.2

FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT AND ITS DETERMINANTS

The ownership, location, and internalization (OLI) framework is generally
considered as the classic paradigm o f the multinational enterprise’s (M NE’s) investment
decisions (Dunning, 1973, 1993). In the OLI framework, MNEs invest internationally
when three sets o f determining factors such as ownership, location, and internalization
factors exist simultaneously. The OLI framework argues that in order for the MNE to
invest through FDI, it must have some kind o f an advantage that overcomes the costs o f
operating in a foreign market. That is, the MNE must have some advantages specific to
the firm and readily transferable between countries, which is the ownership (O) factor.
The location (L) factor implies that the firm must be attracted by location specific
characteristics in the foreign market that will allow it to exploit its advantage in that

4
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(host) market. Finally, the internalization (I) factor implies that the MNE must weigh the
relative benefits and costs o f the variety o f alternative contractual arrangements to
determine how it enters the foreign market and expands its operations over time.
Generally, studies focus on the locational factors o f FDI. However, the absence o f
a generally accepted theoretical framework has led researchers to rely on empirical
evidence for explaining the locational determinants o f FDI. Location specific economic
factors such as the size o f the market measured by the GDP o f the host country, the
availability o f labor, labor costs, inflation, and the availability o f natural resources have
been found to affect FDI inflows.
Indeed, the empirical literature cites a large number o f very different location
specific economic factors that impact investments associated with individual locations.
However, in order for investors to feel safe about their investments in developing
countries, it is widely believed that stable political and social institutions should be in
place. In developing countries, the main factors that affect investors’ confidence are
political risk, institutional factors, and market failure that results in price and exchange
rate uncertainty (Lemi and Asefa, 2003). The ICC (International Chamber o f
Commerce)8 confirms that political instability; bureaucratic bottle-necks and absence o f
proper legal framework are the major factors which investors see as impediments to FDI
in developing countries. However, most studies ignore the importance o f uncertainty that
emanates from macroeconomic variables (such as exchange rates) as well as political and
institutional instabilities that affect FDI inflows. Due to the importance o f these factors in

8 The ICC (International Chamber o f Commerce) is a global business organization that covers a broad
spectrum, from arbitration and dispute resolution to making the case for open trade and the market
economy system, business self-regulation, fighting corruption or combating commercial crime.

5
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affecting investment decisions, recent studies have begun to focus on the impact o f
political risk and host country institutions on capital flows to developing countries.
1.2.1 Political Risk and FD I
Political risk is believed to negatively affect the MNEs’ decisions to invest in a
foreign country. The unpredictability and volatility in the political environment o f the
host market increases the perceived risk and uncertainty experienced by the MNE. This
perception discourages MNEs from entering a host market through FDI since the
occurrence o f political and institutional instability will significantly affect firms’ costs o f
operating in a host country. However, empirical evidence has not come to a consensus
about the effects o f political risk on FDI inflows. A few studies show weak or no effect o f
political risk on FDI inflows. For example, Bennett and Green (1972) and W heeler and
Mody (1992), employing a broad principal component measure o f political risk, find
political risk to be insignificant in explaining U.S. FDI. Conversely, other studies find
political risk decreases FDI inflows (see Biswas, 2002 and Jun and Singh, 1996). In
particular, political risk indicators such as internal armed conflict, political strikes, riots,
and external conflicts have been found to deter FDI inflows by some studies (see Nigh,
1985; and Tuman and Emmert, 1999; and Schneider and Frey, 1985).
Another type o f political factor that might affect FDI inflows is host country
institutional quality. Benassy-Quere et al. (2005) argue that quality o f institutions may
matter for attracting FDI because higher quality institutions may signal higher
productivity prospects for direct investors. Conversely, poor institutions can bring
additional costs to FDI and therefore deter FDI inflows. Some empirical studies support
the hypothesis that poor institutional quality decreases FDI inflows. These studies show

6
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that host country institutions proxied by the prevalence o f corruption have a negative and
significant effect on FDI inflows (see Wei, 2000; Habib and Zurawicki, 2002; and
Asiedu, 2006). However, empirical studies have not consistently found poor host country
institutional quality to be negatively related to FDI inflows. For example, Kolstad and
Villanger (2004) find that corruption increases tertiary sector FDI inflows, while Wheeler
and Mody (1992) find corruption and quality o f the legal system to have no significant
effect on U.S. FDI.
Studies that focus on the linkages between political risk and FDI inflows
specifically to developing economies (see Globerman and Shapiro, 2002; and Busse and
Hefeker, 2005) find governance infrastructure (a country’s political, institutional and
legal environment, as well as the policies that accompany them) to be an important
determinant o f FDI inflows. They find that investments in governance infrastructure not
only attract capital but may also create the conditions under which domestic MNE
emerge and invest abroad.
W ith regards to the impact o f political risk and institutions on FDI inflows to
Africa, empirical research is very limited (for exceptions, see Asiedu, 2002 and 2006,
Lemi and Asefa 2003, and Hamori and Razafimahefa, 2005). This is surprising since
Africa is characterized with a high degree o f political instability, conflict, and inefficient
institutions. Reinhart and R ogoff (2001), show that 40% o f the countries in Africa have
had at least one war (an extreme form o f political instability) during the period o f 19652001 and 28% have had two or more. The probability o f such adverse outcomes might
have a critical influence on FDI inflows. Asiedu (2002, 2006) finds political and
institutional instability to have a negative impact on FDI inflows into African countries.

7
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However, Lemi and Asefa (2003), argue that there is a differential effect o f instability on
different industries due to the nature, size and objectives o f the FDI firms that enter
African economies.
In this paper we investigate the impact o f the overall political risk as well as the
impacts o f political instability and host country institutions on FDI inflows into Africa.
We make use o f the political risk measures provided by International Country Risk Guide
(ICRG) in order to study the effects o f political risk on FDI inflows into African
economies. The ICRG provides overall country political risk indices as well particular
measures o f political instability and host country institutions (such as internal and
external conflict, corruption, and the ability o f the government to ensure law and order).
We employ the overall political risk index in order to measure the joint political and
institutional risk factors that investors face in African economies. Particular measures o f
political instability such as internal conflict and external conflict are used to measure
political stability. Host country institutional quality is captured by corruption,
bureaucratic quality and the extent to which law and order is enforced.
1.2.2 Exchange Rate Uncertainty and FD I
The theoretical literature on FDI and exchange rates has led to a few different
arguments. The traditional view argues that FDI is not related to the foreign exchange
market. Despite the assertions o f the traditional view, some studies have directed the
attention to the possible effects o f depreciations and appreciations o f the real exchange
rates on the location o f domestic and international investment flows. These studies argue
that there are different channels through which exchange rates can affect FDI flows. One
o f these channels represents the wealth position hypothesis that relates FDI to the foreign

8
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exchange markets through the relative wealth o f the two countries. That is, a depreciation
o f the foreign currency increases the relative wealth o f the investing country and makes it
profitable to invest offshore. The other channel, namely, the relative labor cost
hypothesis, indicates that the exchange rate affects FDI thru relative labor costs. In this
case, a foreign country with a depreciating currency represents an opportunity for lower
labor costs. Quite often the results, both theoretical and empirical, indicate that indeed
there is a relationship between FDI and exchange rates (see Cushman, 1988; Froot and
Stein, 1991; Blonnigen, 1997; Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo, 2001; Goldberg and Kolstad,
1995; and Goldberg and Klein, 1997).
In addition, the uncertainty o f exchange rates is also an important factor for
investment decisions (Benassy-Quere et al, 2001). Uncertainty is important to investors
because investors necessarily look into the future before undertaking any investments.
Recent theoretical literature has focused on the work o f Dixit (1989), and Dixit and
Pindyck (1994), which stresses the role played by uncertainty in determining investment
decisions. The irreversible nature o f investment and uncertainty about the future benefits
and costs o f the investment may cause a wait and see attitude in making investment
decisions. FDI Investors care about uncertainty because they look into the long term
horizon before undertaking any investments. Therefore, FDI behavior will be responsive
to the degree o f investment uncertainty about future prices, rates o f return, and economic
conditions (see Dixit and Pindyck, 1994).
The effect o f real exchange rate uncertainty on FDI has been explored by many
studies. However, there is no consensus about the effects o f uncertainty on FDI. If the
purpose o f FDI is to diversify location o f production (increase market share) and to have

9
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the option o f production flexibility, then a positive relationship between uncertainty and
FDI is to be expected. On the other hand, if the purpose o f FDI were either to serve other
markets or bring production back to the home country, a negative relationship between
FDI and exchange rate uncertainty would arise (see Blonigen, 2005).
Empirical work on the effects o f exchange rate uncertainty and FDI inflows has
concentrated on developed economies. However, the few studies that do focus on
developing countries find a negative relationship between uncertainty o f exchange rates
and FDI inflows (see Bennassy-Quere et al, 2001; Lemi and Asefa, 2003). A high degree
o f uncertainty about exchange rates might deter companies from making the initial
investment in developing countries (see Blonigen and Wang, 2004).
The literature has made use o f different methods in order to measure uncertainty.
In general, the future behavior o f an economic variable is uncertain since the probability
o f future events cannot be determined, a priori. Thus, the future volatility o f an economic
variable is seen as a stochastic process that evolves over time with a random and a
deterministic component. We can then define the uncertainty o f an economic variable as
the unpredictable portion o f its volatility (see Carruth et al., 2000, and Crawford and
Kasumovich, 1996). Both conditional and unconditional measures o f volatility have been
used in the literature in order to proxy exchange rate volatility. A classic measure used to
proxy volatility is the rolling variance, which is an unconditional measure. On the other
hand, conditional measures such as the ARCH and GARCH processes are popular
measures o f volatility. In contrast to the unconditional variance o f a variable, conditional
variance uses the previous information to measure volatility.

10
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The rolling variance displays the total variability o f the series; however, part o f
that total variability is predictable. It is often argued that unconditional measures o f
volatility should be stronger measures o f total volatility because they include both,
expected and unexpected volatility (see Goldberg and Kolstad, 1995). However, when
studying uncertainty, the conditional should be a better measure because it captures the
unexpected volatility (Crawford and Kasumovich, 1996). Therefore the ARCH/GARCH
models have been used by many studies that focus on volatility, since they generate the
conditional variances o f a variable.

In this study, we make use o f volatility o f the

exchange rate generated from ARCH/GARCH models in order to measure exchange rate
uncertainty.

1.3

THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

The literature offers a number o f theoretical models that analyze the impact o f
uncertainty on FDI inflows. Most o f these models have been developed to explain FDI
inflows into developed economies. However, recently some theoretical studies have
focused on developing/emerging economies and uncertainty. One such theoretical model
that analyzes the impact o f uncertainty on FDI inflows is that o f Baniak et al (2005). In
particular, Baniak et al (2005) develop a theoretical model that takes into account the
impact o f uncertainty o f the economic and legal environment, on the pattern o f FDI for
transition economies. They motivate their theoretical model by arguing that in many
transition economies, legal changes accompanying market reforms have taken place.
However, the new regulatory acts developed in some o f these countries do not reflect the
specific social, economic and political conditions that prevail in the new republics. In
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addition, it is quite common that already prevailing laws are frequently revised in short
periods o f time. This creates an uncertainty with regard to the prevailing legal and
economic environment in these countries, and acts as hindrance to investment activity.
The model developed by Baniak et al (2005) can be applied to African economies
since most African countries are also characterized with uncertainty that arises from
economic variables such as exchange rates as well as uncertainty from political and
institutional environment. Reinhart and Rogoff (2001) show that civil unrest, conflicts,
and wars occur more frequently in Africa than any other region.9 Therefore, the
unpredictability and volatility o f the political environment o f these economies increases
the perceived risk and uncertainty experienced by the MNE. The increase in risk might
translate into less FDI inflows into these economies.
In addition, FDI is sensitive to uncertainty stemming from poor quality o f
institutions such as government inefficiency, policy reversals, graft or weak enforcement
o f property rights (Benassy et al, 2005). Inefficient institutions might lead to
“commitment problems” on the part o f the host country, in the sense that it may renege
on policy promises once key long-term investments are made (see Acemoglu, 2005).
Investor surveys and studies show that weak enforcement o f contracts, policy reversals,
and corruption are prevalent in Africa (Asiedu, 2002, 2006). Consequently, investors face
another type o f risk with regards to the prevailing institutional environment when
investing in Africa.
Thus, in this section, we adopt the simple model developed by Baniak et al (2005)
to explain investing decisions by MNEs to Africa. Our model follows Baniak et al
(2005), and describes the process o f decision-making concerning FDI in a country with
9 Their analysis covers the period 1965-2001.
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an unstable economic and political environment. When making investing decisions,
MNEs face uncertainty o f basic economic variables such as the exchange rate. In this
study, we make use o f volatility o f the exchange rate generated from ARCH/GARCH
models in order to measure exchange rate uncertainty. Another important uncertainty is
o f the political type; for example, the occurrence o f political instability or the prevalence
o f inefficient institutions might significantly affect firms’ costs o f operating in a foreign
country. In this paper, we use the overall political risk index to measure the combined
effects o f political and institutional risks faced by MNEs. In addition, we use particular
measures o f political instability and institutional quality provided by the ICRG in order to
capture the differential impacts o f political instability and institutional inefficiency.
Therefore, the purpose o f adopting this model is to show the impact o f exchange rate
uncertainty and political risk on the decisions o f MNEs concerning FDI into Africa.
1.3.1 The Model
Following Baniak et al (2005), we assume that the M NE10 considers 2 possible
alternatives as to where to produce its commodity.11 It can produce the commodity in a
plant located in a host country or the MNE has an alternative to build a plant and produce
in its own home country.12 Another important assumption that follows from Baniak et al
(2005) and Sung and Lapan (2000) is that each plant is assumed to exhibit decreasing
average cost, so that in a deterministic setting only one plant will be built.

10 We assume that these MNEs are managed by typical risk-averse agents. The decisions in each firm are
made by a group o f decision-makers with sufficiently similar preferences to guarantee the existence o f a
group preference function, representable by a strictly concave Von Neuman-Morgenstem utility function
(for further discussion in this matter see Sandmo (1971)).
11 Following Sung and Lapan (2000) we assume that the firm produces a homogeneous commodity.
12 Host country refers to the destination country for FDI. And home country refers to the home country o f
the MNE.
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In addition, every plant faces a perfectly elastic demand, that is, the MNE can sell
any volume produced at the world market price (P worid)• Moreover, regardless o f where
the firm builds its plant, it will face costs associated with the operation o f the plant.
However, the firm faces uncertainty about the costs o f producing in the host country
(these uncertainties arise due to political and institutional instabilities). An important
assumption is that, the costs o f the plant built in the host country are expressed in the
currency o f the host country and do not depend on the exchange rate (that is, only local
resources are used in the production process). Similarly, the costs o f the plant built in the
home country o f the MNE are expressed in the currency o f the home country.
We focus on a single commodity market in a host country. We assume that this
particular commodity is not produced in the host country, but demand is satisfied by
imports. Now suppose there exists an MNE that wants to produce this commodity in the
host country. The unit price o f this commodity, Pworid, is determined in the world market
and is expressed in the currency o f the home country o f the MNE.
In the fully deterministic case, profits created by the host country’s plant,
expressed in the host country’s currency, are given by:
Tlhost

(Q) - (l/e)P world- Q -

C host

(3.1.3)

(Q)

where Q 13 denotes output from the plant, Chost denotes the costs prevailing in the host
country and e denotes exchange rate o f the home country’s currency in the host country
(expressed as the number o f units o f the home country’s currency for one unit o f the host
country’s currency). Similarly, profits o f the home plant, expressed in home currency are:
Plhome ( Q )

(3.1.4)

P w o rld • Q ~ Chom e ( Q ).

13 We assume that the output produced, namely Q, cannot be greater than maximum capacity, K.
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Note that the profits o f the plant built in the home country do not depend on
exchange rates. However, the profits from the host country (knowing the demand curve)
depend on estimations o f exchange rate and production cost that in general, depend on a
number o f macroeconomic indicators and political and institutional situations. In
particular, the exchange rate is influenced by macroeconomic situations which are not
known for certain. On the other hand, political risk (political instability and host country
institutions), are included in the calculation o f the cost o f production.
The M NE’s investing decisions are made by looking at macroeconomic forecasts
and political risk predictions. Therefore the MNE makes its investing decisions in an
uncertain environment. The firm faces exchange rate uncertainty (resulting from an
unstable macroeconomic environment), and uncertainty about the cost o f production
(resulting from unstable political situations and host country institutional factors).
Following Baniak et al (2005) we consider the exchange rate and cost o f production to be
random variables (we also assume that the two random variables are independent o f each
other, described by certain probability distributions) known at the moment o f decision
making.
Recall that the MNE is risk-averse; therefore its utility function is concave. When
making decisions about building a plant and about the volume o f output, the risk-averse
MNE does not maximize profit.14 Instead it maximizes the expected utility from profit.
The MNE when contemplating opening the plant in the host country, analyzes the value
specified as U (e

% host

(Q)), where e

H h o st

(Q) are profits from the host plant expressed in

14 Lower profit with lower risk could sometimes be better for a risk-averse firm than higher profit with
higher risk.
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home currency. Note that the expected utility from profit in the host country increases if
the expected cost decreases and/or if the expected value o f the exchange rate decreases.
When the firm considers opening the plant in its own country, the profits are fully
deterministic and given by equation 3.1.1. Hence the utility function value is U( %home
(Q)J, where Q is the optimal volume o f output produced. Let’s denote the optimal level o f
output by Q*. Then the target value is equal to U(%home (Q*))- In order to make a decision
in which country the plant should be built, the firm compares the maximum o f expected
utility U(e %host (Q)), with the target value U (nhome (Q *)).
The MNE follows the following order when considering the possibility o f
building the new plant: First, it learns about the probability distributions o f the exchange
rate and costs in the host country. Second, it finds the optimal value o f production Q*,
which maximizes the expected utility U(e

J ih o s t

(Q)), for the host country’s plant, and

third, if the level o f utility computed in the host country’s plant (i.e. U(e Uhost (Q)) ) is
higher than the target value U( %home (Q* )), the firm builds a new plant in the host
country, otherwise the new plant will be built in its home country. And finally, the values
o f e (exchange rate) and c (cost) are realized.
The purpose o f this model is to show how the expected utility from profit depends
on the variability o f the exchange rate and cost o f production. In order to discuss how
expected utility depends on exchange rate and cost variability, Baniak et al (2005) closely
follow the analysis given by Sandmo (1971). Sandmo (1971) makes a given distribution
more risky by “stretching” the probability distribution around a constant mean. Following
Sandmo (1971), we increase the variability o f the two random variables, namely,
exchange rate and cost. For example, we increase the variability o f the exchange rate e by

16

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

transforming it into a new random variable ve, defined as ve= (1+h) e +h (E (e)), where h
is a constant coefficient (h>0). The new variable ve has the same expected value and the
same shape o f distribution function as e, but a larger variance. In the same way we can
increase the variability o f the cost. Increasing the variability o f these random variables
leads to the proposition given by Baniak et al (2005):
Proposition 1. Consider a risk-averse M NE that can open a plant at home or in the host
country. Given the cost functions and the sequence o f decision making; then i f the
variability o f the exchange rate in the host country increases or the variability o f costs
increases, then the expected utility from investing in the host country decreases.
From proposition 1 we can derive a testable hypothesis. Economic, political and
institutional stability (that is the reduction o f the variability o f forecasted variables such
as exchange rate and cost) stimulates the inflow o f FDI to the country. On the contrary,
exchange rate, political and institutional instability reduces the inflow o f FDI to the
country.
In this paper, we use conditional variances obtained from GARCH models to
measure exchange rate uncertainty. In addition, we use overall political risk indicators (as
well as particular political and institutional stability indicators) provided by the ICRG to
measure the combined effects o f political and institutional risks faced by MNEs. In
addition, we use particular measures o f political instability and institutional quality
provided by the ICRG in order to capture the differential impacts o f political instability
and institutional inefficiency. Then by controlling for other factors (location specific
economic determinants) that affect FDI inflows into African economies, we test the
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proposition o f the model presented above that exchange rate uncertainty as well as
political risk hinder FDI inflows into these economies.

1.4 DATA
Our analysis covers 12 African economies15 for the period 1985 through 2004.
The variables used in this study are annual in frequency; however, the exchange rates
used to generate the conditional variances for the selected African economies are
monthly.16 The data sources for our variables are the World Development Indicators
(WDI), the International Financial Statistics (IFS) CD-ROM, and the International
Country Risk Guide (ICRG). All variables except the political risk indicators, monthly
exchange rates, and monthly consumer price indices were retrieved from the World
Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI). Both the nominal exchange rate and the
consumer price index used to construct our real exchange rate variable were obtained
from the International Financial Statistics CD-ROM. We use the real exchange rate since
uncertain price levels as well as exchange rates are relevant for long-term investments.
The political risk indicators were taken from the ICRG dataset.
Following the literature, our dependent variable is FDI inflows scaled by the GDP
o f each host country. Our independent variables can be grouped into different categories
such as macroeconomic variables, labor force availability and quality, natural resource
availability, infrastructure quality, investment profile, overall political risk indicators,

15 The countries are Botswana, Egypt, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Malawi, Sierra Leone, South
Africa, Togo, Uganda, and Zambia. The selection o f these countries was based on data availability.
16 We aggregate the monthly conditional variances into annual frequency to obtain our annual volatility
measures.
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political instability and host country institutions indicators, and exchange rate uncertainty
measures.17
The macroeconomic variables included in this study are GDP growth (GDPGRT),
inflation rate (INFL), openness (OPEN), and exchange rates (XR). The growth rate o f
GDP measures the market potential o f the countries used in this study. Some studies
argue that FDI to Africa is attracted by potential markets therefore it is important to
control for market size or potential when analyzing the FDI inflows into the region (see
Asiedu, 2006). The inflation rate is included in our study in order to capture the
macroeconomic stability o f the economies in question.
Moreover, as is common in the literature, openness (OPEN) is captured by the
share o f trade in GDP (that is, (X+M)/GDP). Most studies use this variable as a measure
o f trade restrictions. A firm investing in a foreign country may import raw materials and
semi-manufactured goods and export processed commodities; therefore the host
country’s trade policy might affect its investing decisions. On the other hand, exchange
rates are added in order to observe if the depreciation or appreciation o f the host
country’s real exchange rate encourages FDI inflows.
Labor force quality is captured by the literacy rate (LR) while labor force
availability is proxied by ratio o f economically active labor force, those with ages
between 15 and 64 to total population (POP). Infrastructure quality proxied by the
number o f telephone lines per capita (INFRA) has been found to affect FDI inflows to
African economies; therefore we include a proxy for infrastructure development. In
addition, a dummy variable that takes account o f the presence o f natural resources (NR),
such as minerals or oil in the country, is included since the most FDI inflows into African
17 For the descriptive statistics refer to Table 1.1.
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economies is driven by natural resource availability.18 We also take account o f the rate o f
return on investment (RR) by using log o f the inverse o f the real GDP per capita (for
explanations about the construction o f this variable, see Asiedu, 2002). The variable is
also used in order to use the concept o f first degree stochastic dominance to understand if
an improvement in the rate o f return to investment increases the attractiveness o f the
African economies.
In addition to the variables mentioned above, measures for exchange rate
uncertainty and political risk are included in our regressions. We use GARCH measures
o f the real exchange rates19 to proxy exchange rate uncertainty (GARCH) as they are
closer to capture the concept o f foreign exchange uncertainty. On the other hand, the
overall political risk indices (POLRISKS) for each host country are used to proxy the
political risk MNEs face. In order to evaluate particular components o f political risk, we
use measures o f political instability such as the external conflict (EXT) and internal
conflict (INT) from the ICRG. Host country institutions are proxied by the level o f
corruption (CORRU), the extent to which the rule o f law is enforced (LAW), and
bureaucracy quality (BURQ). Kaufmann et al., (1999) confirm that these variables
constitute relevant sub-components o f an overall assessment o f “good governance”.

18

African countries endowed with abundance o f natural resources such as Nigeria, Angola, Equatorial
Guinea and Sudan joined Egypt as Africa’s top FDI recipients, all o f them registering inflows o f more than
US$ 1 billion (UNCTAD 2005). These five African countries rich in natural resources accounted for almost
half o f African FDI in 2004. FDI inflows to many African countries, especially those poor in natural
resources and classified as having least developed economies, were less than US$100 million each last
year.
19 We use the real rather than the nominal exchange rate, since uncertain price levels as well as exchange
rates are relevant for long-term investments. All real exchange rates used in this chapter are bilateral
exchange rates vis-a-vis the U.S. dollar. The real exchange rates are calculated by multiplying the ratio o f
prices in the United States relative to national prices by the nominal exchange rates. Thus an increase in the
real exchange rate index would indicate an appreciation o f the U.S. dollar.
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In addition, the investment risk (INVP) o f the country given by the ICRG will be
used in order to assess if the country is perceived to be risky for investments. This
measure contains sub components such as contract viability, expropriation o f assets and
ability o f multinationals to repatriate profits. It assesses risks to investment that are not
covered by other political and economic risk indicators For more explanatory information
on data procedures refer to the appendix. Also for descriptive statistics and expected
results refer to Tables 1.1 and 1.2.

1.5 ESTIMATION METHODOLOGY
1.5.1 Exchange Rate Uncertainty Specification
To account for the effects o f exchange rate uncertainty we estimate a
ARCH/GARCH measure o f conditional volatility. This measure involves obtaining the
variance o f the unpredictable part o f the series. This is obtained by first specifying a
stochastic process for the series. That is, we develop a forecasting equation for the
exchange rate based on an information set. The forecasting equation is estimated to
obtain the residuals and the uncertainty measure is computed as the variance o f the
estimated residuals. The stochastic process that generates the predictable part can be any
ARIMA (p, q) model. In contrast to the unconditional variance o f a variable, conditional
variance uses the previous information to measure volatility.
The ARCH/GARCH model has become a popular method to study volatility
(Engle, 1982; Bollerslev, 1986). Unlike the measures o f uncertainty such as rolling
variances, the ARCH/GARCH approach to estimating uncertainty is obtained on the basis
o f an estimated econometric model. It is often observed that this method captures
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volatility in each period more accurately. The ARCH/GARCH model characterizes the
distribution o f the stochastic error s t conditional on the realized values o f the set o f
variables that may include lagged values o f the conditional variance. The generalized
ARCH model, namely the GARCH (p, q) model is specified as follows:
et/\(/t-i ~D(0, ht2)...................................................

(5.1.1)

h?=a0+'Zai£t-i+HS
rf-i’....................................
=1
1

(5J-2)

Yt = f(xt; 8) + et

i

i=

Where f (xt; 8) refers to the conditional mean, xt consists o f a vector o f
explanatory variables that may include lagged yt’s, 8 is a M xl vector o f parameters, \|/t-i
is the information set that contains all the information available through time t-1, and et is
the error term which follows, conditional on vj/t_i, a D distribution. The conditional errors
have zero mean and time varying variance, ht2. The conditional variance follows a
GARCH process as in (5.1.2). The conditional variance, h] the proxy for uncertainty, is
the one period ahead forecast variance based on the past information. It is a function o f
three terms: the mean level o f volatility a 0 , the ARCH term20 s^_i and the GARCH
term h f . 21
1.5.2 Fixed Effects and Arellano-Bond Dynamic Panel Models
In this paper, given the fact that we analyze the net flow o f FDI from all source
countries to the 12 host countries in Africa, we start out by employing panel data

20 The ARCH term is the lag o f squared errors from the mean equation or news about volatility from the
previous period.
21 To ensure a well-defined process, all the parameters in the infinite order AR representation must lie
outside the unit circle. For a GARCH (1,1) process this will be the case if CC1 and 5i are non-negative. It is
also required that a l+ S l < 1 for covariance stationarity.
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techniques that take into account country-specific effects. Panel data models take the
country-specific heterogeneities o f these countries into account. The fixed effect22
estimation includes the country-specific effects as regressors rather than assigning them
to the error term, thereby reducing omitted variable bias. In addition to a fixed effects
model, we also employ the Arellano-Bond dynamic panel GMM estimator. Some studies
have found lagged FDI to be highly significant in their regressions (see, Gastanaga et al
(1998) and Busse and Hefeker (2005)). That is, FDI in the previous period might be
relevant for FDI in the current period. MNEs might be more attracted by host countries
that already have considerable FDI inflows, since having considerable FDI inflows might
signal a success o f other MNEs. Therefore it is important to include the lagged dependent
variable into our regressions. The Arellano-Bond GMM dynamic panel estimator
includes the lagged dependent variable as an additional regressor and therefore addresses
the problem o f autocorrelation o f the residuals.
This estimator also deals with the fact that some o f the control variables are
endogenous. The fixed effect estimation assumes that all our regressors are exogenous.
However, this might not be realistic with some o f our regressors. For example, in the case
o f openness to trade, FDI inflows are likely to affect the overall trading volume if the
MNEs import raw materials and semi-manufactured goods and export processed
commodities. Likewise, FDI may increase the host country capital stock, bring in new
technologies and boost GDP growth rates as well as boosting GDP per capita (see Busse
and Hefeker, 2005). In order to take the endogeneity issue into account, we employ an

22 We use the Hausman (1978) test to determine whether a fixed effect model or a random effect model is
more appropriate. In our case, the Hausman test confirmed the use o f a fixed effects model.
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instrumental variable type approach, namely Arellano-Bond generalized method o f
moments (GMM).
In the Arellano-Bond dynamic panel estimator, the fixed effects are removed by
first-differencing the data. Then an instrumental variable estimation o f the differenced
equation is performed. As instruments for the lagged difference o f the dependent
variable, all lagged levels o f the variables at hand are employed. One o f the basic
assumptions for applying the Arellano-Bond estimator is no second-order serial
correlation in the residuals o f the differenced specification. Therefore, before we employ
the Arellano-Bond GMM dynamic panel estimator, we have to test for second order serial
correlation o f our residuals. In addition, the overall appropriateness o f the instruments
must be verified by a Sargan test o f over-identifying restrictions.
For both the fixed effect and Arellano-Bond GMM estimation, we have two
model specifications. The first model specification employs the composite political risk
index (to measure the combined political and institutional risk o f investing in the selected
economies). The second model specification uses the particular measures o f political and
institutional quality noted in section 4. For each model specification, the first set o f
estimations uses the traditional economic determinants o f FDI (such as, economic
variables, infrastructure quality, labor force availability and quality, investment profile o f
the countries), the proxy for overall political risk (or particular measures o f political risk
such as political instability and institutional quality measures), and GARCH measures o f
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exchange rate uncertainty. Second set o f estimations add an interaction term o f exchange
rate uncertainty and political risk measure(s) to the first model.23
The fixed effects models are as follows:
FDI/GDPit = (3() + /?,GDPGRTit + /?, GARCH it + /?3INFLit + /?4L R ]t + A POP it +
/?6INFRAit + A O P E N it + A IN V Pit + /?9R R it + Ac N R ft + A ,X R it+tf(POLRISK(S))it

FDI/GDPit = y 0+ y lGDPGRTit + y2GARCH it + y3INFLit + y4L R it + y5POPlt + y 6 INFRAit +
y7OPENit + y8INVPit + y9R R it + r 10N R it+ yn R R it,+^(PO LR ISK (S))it +
a ( GARCH * POLRISK(S))it

Where, A and y 0 are the country specific fixed-effect.
The A rellano-B ond G M M models are as follows:
AFDI/GDP i t =j30 + A AFDI/GDP lM + A AGDPGRT it + A ^, GARCH it + A A IN FL it +
/?5ALR It + /?6APOP it + A AINFRA it + A A O PEN it + /?9AINVPit +
A 0A RRit + A . ANR ,t + A 2 AXR it + <5A(POLRISK(S ))it

AFDEGDP i t = J30 + A AFDI/GDP it l + J32AGDPGRT it + A A GARCH it + A A IN FL it +
/?5ALRit + A A PO P it + A AINFRA it + A A O PEN it + A A IN Y Pit +
A 0A RRit + A i A N Rit + A 2 AXR it + AA(POLRISK(S ))it + ^A(GARCH *POLRISK(S) ) it

1.6 RESULTS
1.6.1 Results from GARCH Models
To generate measures o f uncertainty captured by ARCH/GARCH measures o f

23 We test for correct specification for a parametric model we use a test implemented by Hsiao, Li & Racine
(2003). However, we could not reject the null hypothesis for correctly specified parametric model. In
addition, we employ non-linearity tests (such as the Ramsey regression equation specification error test
(Reset)) for non-linearity in the risk and uncertainty variables. The null hypothesis o f linearity was not
rejected. Consequently, the linear models we employ in this study are a good fit for our data.
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conditional volatility, monthly real exchange rates for each o f the African countries were
used. However, before estimation o f our ARCH/GARCH models, we conducted some
preliminary data analysis such as checking for the presence o f unit roots. The results from
the Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) Test for unit roots suggest that the log o f the real
exchange rates for all the countries under consideration are 1(1) processes. That is, the
real exchange rate for each country has a unit root in levels while they are difference
stationary. As a result, to ensure the stationarity o f our variables, we use the first
differences to fit ARCH/GARCH models and to generate the conditional variances.
Table 1.3 presents the coefficients o f the GARCH (p, q) estimation. As can be
seen from Table 1.3, the coefficients o f the GARCH (p, q) have the theoretical signs and
magnitude. Figure 1.1 shows a plot o f exchange rate uncertainty (h t ) for each country in
our study. Once the monthly exchange rate uncertainty measures ( ht ) are obtained, they
are aggregated to produce annual series, and included into our regressions.
1.6.2 Fixed Effects and Arellano-Bond Dynamic Panel Estimation Results
Tables 1.4 and 1.5 show the fixed effects results with robust standard errors.
Table 1.4 displays results for model specification 1 (i.e. using the overall political risk
index). Table 1.5 presents results for model specification 2 (i.e. employing the particular
measures o f political risk noted in section 4). Dynamic panel GMM estimator results are
displayed in Tables 1.6 and 1.7. Table 1.6 presents results for model specification 1 and
Table 1.7 displays results for model specification 2.
The fixed effects results presented in Tables 1.4 and 1.5 show that most o f the
variables and all the significant variables have their expected signs. For example, the
inflation rate has a negative sign and is significant meaning that a high rate o f inflation
26
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can signal economic instability o f the host country. The negative sign for inflation is
supportive o f previous findings (see Asiedu, 2006). In addition, the openness and literacy
rate variables have the expected positive signs and are significant. If the MNE imports
raw materials and semi-manufactured goods and exports processed commodities, then
openness o f the country might positively affect its investing decisions. Similarly, the
literacy rate is expected to positively affect FDI since foreign firms most likely enter host
countries with high labor productivity and skilled labor forces. Previous studies have also
found measures o f openness and literacy rate to have a positive relationship with FDI
inflows (For results regarding measures o f openness, see Edwards, 1990; for studies
regarding literacy rate see, Asiedu, 2006 and Lemi and Asefa, 2003).
The investment profile from the ICRG that measures the risks to investment (that
are not covered by other political and economic risks) also has the expected sign and is
significant. This measure contains sub components such as contract viability,
expropriation o f assets and ability o f multinationals to repatriate profits. These sub
components are extremely important for M NEs’ decisions on where to invest. As a result,
the significant and negative sign o f this variable implies that the higher the risk to
investment the lower FDI inflows. This result is supportive o f previous research (see
Busse and Hefeker, 2005 and Asiedu, 2006).
The rate o f return to investment, natural resource availability, and exchange rates
have their expected signs but are not statistically significant. The insignificance o f the
rate of return to investment and natural resource availability is surprising since we would
expect a high rate o f return to investment as well as natural resource availability to
increase FDI inflows. However, since Africa is perceived to be risky, a higher return to
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investment might not translate into higher FDI. That is, for risk-averse investors, the high
return might not offset the risk associated with the investment. Some previous studies
also document the insignificance o f the rate o f return o f investment in explaining FDI
inflows into Africa (see Asiedu, 2002 and Hamori and Razafimahefa, 2005).
Similarly, the dummy variable that takes account o f the natural resource
availability has the expected positive sign. However, the insignificance could be because
our dummy variable for natural resource availability might not capture the full effects o f
natural resource availability on FDI inflows into these economies. The exchange rates are
not statistically significant but have the expected sign indicating that a depreciation o f the
host country’s real exchange rate encourages FDI inflows.
The negative and significant coefficient o f the GARCH measure o f uncertainty is
indicative o f a negative impact o f exchange rate uncertainty on FDI flows into African
economies (such results are in line with Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo, 2001; Lemi and
Asefa, 2003; and Hamori and Razafimahefa, 2005). The negative coefficient o f the
measure o f exchange rate uncertainty confirms the predictions o f the theoretical model
presented in section 3; that the MNE will ignore better business opportunities in the host
country if it expects a high variability o f the exchange rate. FDI investors lack the
capability to hedge (in order to reduce risk o f exchange rate variability) in the long run,
therefore exchange rate volatility might be an important determinant for risk-averse
investors (Benassy-Quere et al, 2001 and Hamori and Razafimahefa, 2005). Therefore,
stabilization o f currency is an important factor that should be attained as a measure to
promote FDI.
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Similarly the coefficient for the overall political risk index is negative as
expected, and is significant. This result is in line with our expectations. As mentioned in
section 3, political risk creates an additional cost to investors, therefore one would expect
a negative relationship with FDI inflows. In addition, we add an interaction term o f the
measure o f exchange rate uncertainty and political risk, since we are also interested in
observing the combined effect o f macroeconomic uncertainty and political risks. Column
(3) shows that this interaction term is negative and significant. This result implies that
exchange rate uncertainty impacts FDI negatively with the presence o f political risk.
Table 1.5 displays results obtained by employing particular measures o f political
instability and institutional quality. Table 1.5 shows that measures o f political instability,
namely, external and internal conflict are not significant but have the expected negative
signs. Busse and Hefeker (2005) also report the insignificance o f external conflict in
explaining FDI inflows for developing countries. Likewise, we find corruption and law
and order (measures o f host country institutions), to be insignificant in explaining FDI
inflows. The insignificance o f most o f the particular measures o f political instability and
host country institutional quality is surprising. However, one explanation could be that
when deciding to invest in a certain host country, the MNE’s primary focus might be on
the overall political risk (of a host country) rather than the particular risks associated with
the country.
However, one o f the measures o f institutional quality, namely, bureaucratic
quality, is found to negatively and significantly affect FDI inflows. If the bureaucracy o f
a certain country does not have the strength and expertise to govern without drastic
changes in policy or interruptions in government services, then a decrease in FDI inflows
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is to be expected. Because FDI decisions are irreversible, the prospect o f policy reversals
makes investing in Africa risky. For example, a World Bank (1994) survey o f 150 foreign
investors in East Africa found the risk o f policy reversal to be the most important risk
factor (see World Bank, 1994 and Asiedu, 2002). Thus, if the government is able to
govern without changes in policy, the country’s attractiveness for FDI increases.
Columns (2-5) show results when the interaction terms are added. However, some
o f these interaction terms between exchange rate uncertainty and the particular measures
o f political risk are correlated. We add the correlated terms singly into our regressions.
As can be seen from these columns, the interaction terms between exchange rate
uncertainty and law and order as well as exchange rate uncertainty and bureaucratic
quality are significant and have the expected signs. This implies that exchange rate
uncertainty affects FDI inflows negatively with the presence o f these types o f host
country institutional inefficiencies.
The next type o f estimation methodology, namely the Arellano-Bond dynamic
panel GMM estimator includes the lagged dependent variable as an additional regressor.
FDI in the previous period might be relevant for FDI in the current period and therefore
MNEs might be more attracted by host countries that already have considerable FDI
inflows, since having considerable FDI inflows might signal a success o f other MNEs.
Therefore it is justified to include the lagged dependent variable (FDI t-i) into our
regressions. In addition, the fixed effects estimation (Tables 1.4 and 1.5) assumes that all
our regressors are exogenous. However, some o f our regressors might be endogenous to
FDI decisions. In order to account for these potentially endogenous variables, we employ
an instrumental variable type approach. The Arellano-Bond generalized method of
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moments (GMM) deals with the fact that some o f the control variables are endogenous.
In addition, the Arellano-Bond GMM dynamic panel estimator addresses the problem o f
autocorrelation o f the residuals, since the lagged dependent variable is included as an
additional regressor.
One of the basic assumptions for applying the Arellano-Bond estimator is no
second-order serial correlation. For our data sample, the null-hypothesis o f no second
order serial correlation was not rejected.

In addition, we verified the overall

appropriateness o f the instruments by a Sargan test o f over-identifying restrictions. The
Sargan test results show that our instruments are valid (see Tables 1.6 and 1.7).
As expected, Tables 1.6 and 1.7 show that the lagged dependent variable (FDI t.i)
is significant and positive in all the specified models. This result implies that host
countries that already have considerable FDI inflows attract more FDI. Moreover, the
Arellano-Bond GMM estimation results are similar to the fixed effects results in that
control variables such as openness, investment profile (that measures contract viability
and ability o f multinationals to repatriate profits) and inflation still continue to be
consistently significant and continue to have their expected signs. The bureaucratic
quality remains to have its expected sign and to be significant. Exchange rate uncertainty
also continues to be significant and negative. However, Columns (1 and 2) o f Table 1.6
show that overall political risk is not significant individually, but only when interacted
with exchange rate uncertainty.
To summarize the overall results, the fixed effects and Arellano-Bond GMM
estimations give similar results. Conditional variances o f exchange rates measured by
GARCH models exhibited negative and significant coefficients implying exchange rate
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uncertainty is a deterrent o f FDI inflows to African economies. Similarly, in line with our
expectations, overall political risk also is shown to deter FDI inflows to African
economies. Control variables such as inflation, openness, literacy rate, and investment
profile (that measures contract viability and ability o f multinationals to repatriate profits)
had significant and expected signs. These results imply that implementing sound and
stable macroeconomic policies and improving political environment (thereby reducing
the political risk associated with investing) may significantly increase FDI inflows into
these economies.

1.7

CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS

This study examined the roles o f macroeconomic uncertainty and political risk in
affecting FDI inflows into African economies. The past few decades have witnessed a
surge o f FDI inflows to developing regions. However, FDI inflows to Africa still remain
small when compared to other developing regions. Investor surveys show political risk
(arising from political instability and inefficient institutions) and macroeconomic
uncertainty to be strong deterrents o f FDI inflows to Africa. Nevertheless, with regards to
the impact o f macroeconomic uncertainty and political risk on FDI inflows into Africa,
empirical research is very limited.
As a result, we used a sample o f 12 African countries, and employed Fixed Effect
and Arellano-Bond GMM estimators to investigate the impact o f exchange rate
uncertainty and political risk on FDI inflows into African economies. The results show
that exchange rate uncertainty and political risk reduce the FDI inflows into African
economies. Exchange rate uncertainty consistently exhibited negative and significant
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coefficients implying that exchange rate uncertainty is a deterrent o f FDI inflows to
African economies. The overall political risk index was similarly negative and significant
implying that political risk discourages FDI inflows into these economies. These results
are supportive o f the predictions o f the theoretical model presented.
Results across specifications point to the fact that implementing stable
macroeconomic policies such as stabilization o f currency and adopting an investor
friendly regulatory framework; for instance, removing restrictions on trade and profit
repatriation may significantly increase FDI inflows into these economies. In addition,
these African economies can increase FDI inflows by improving their institutional and
political environment thereby reducing the political risk associated with investing in their
countries.
A Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) study by the W orld Bank Institute
and World Bank Development Economics Vice-presidency shows that several countries
in Africa including Niger, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, and Rwanda have made significant
progress in improving governance over the past decade. It is therefore important for these
countries to publicize this type o f positive information in order to change their perception
o f being risky.
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APPENDIX

The overall political risk index (POLRISKS) ranges from 0-100; where scores
ranging from 0-49.9 imply very high risk, 50-59.9 high risk, 60-69.9 moderate risk, VO79.9 low risk and finally 80-100 imply very low risk. To make the interpretation o f our
results easier, we convert the indices into categorical dummy variables. The categorical
dummy has four categories: very high risk category (if index ranges from is 0-49.9), high
risk category (if index ranges 50-59.9), moderate risk category (if the index is 60-69.9),
low risk (if the index is 70-79.9), very low risk (if the index is 80-100). We use the very
low risk category as a reference group and therefore our dummy variables take a value o f
0 for the very low risk group, a value o f 1 for low risk group, a value o f 2 for moderate
risk group, a value o f 3 for high risk group, and a value o f 4 for very high risk group.
Measures o f political instability such as the external conflict (EXT) and internal
conflict (INT) have ratings that range from 0-12. A high rating implies no internal or
external conflict. To make the interpretation o f the coefficients easier, we convert these
indices into categorical dummy variables. The categorical dummy for both measures o f
political instability has three categories: high risk category (if index ranges from is 0 to
4), medium risk category (if index ranges 4.1 -8), and low risk if (the index is 8.1 to 12).
We use the low risk category as a reference group and therefore our dummy variables
take a value o f 0 for the low risk group, a value o f 1 for medium risk group and a value o f
2 for high risk group.
The bureaucratic quality measure is given a high point if the bureaucracy o f a
certain country has the strength and expertise to govern without drastic changes in policy

38

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

or interruptions in government services. The ratings for this measure ranges from 0 to 4.
The corruption variable measures the degree o f corruption within the political system. It
covers actual or potential corruption in the form o f nepotism, excessive patronage and
bribery. The rule o f law variable measures the impartiality o f the legal system and the
extent to which the rule o f law is enforced. The ratings for corruption and rule o f law
range from 0 to 6, a high rating indicates that corruption is less prevalent and a more
impartial legal system. For all the three measures o f host country institutions, we create
binary dummy variables. We have a category for low level o f institutional quality (i.e.
high level o f corruption, partial legal system, weak bureaucratic quality), and a category
for high level o f institutional quality (i.e. low level o f corruption, impartial legal system,
strong bureaucratic quality). Our reference group for all three measures is the category
for high level o f institutional quality. We define our binary dummies to have a value o f 1
for low level o f institutional quality (and 0 otherwise).
In addition, the investment risk (INVP) o f the country given by the ICRG will be
used in order to assess if the country is perceived to be risky for investments. The
investment profile index ranges from 0 to 12 where a higher score implies low risk to
investment. We convert the index into a categorical dummy variable which has three
categories: high risk category (if index ranges from is 0 to 4), medium risk category (if
index ranges 4.1 -8), and low risk if (the index is 8.1 to 12). We use the low risk category
as a reference group and therefore our categorical dummy variable takes a value o f 0 for
the low risk group, a value o f 1 for medium risk group and a value o f 2 for high risk
group.
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Table 1.1 -- Descriptive Statistics (Obs. 240)
Variables
Mean Std. Dev.
Dependent variable
100*(FDI/GDP)

1.206

2.199

GDP Growth

0.085

0.445

Macroeconomic Variables
Openness

62.654

21.988

Exchange Rate

5.104

2.478

Inflation Rate

24.016

34.834

Literacy Rate

61.551

16.875

Population between 15-64 per total population

53.003

3.665

Investment Profile

0.900

0.547

Rate o f Return on Investment

-9.756

2.432

Log o f umber o f telephone lines per capita

2.293

1.221

0.504

0.501

0.011

0.033

2.808

0.984

External Conflict

0.425

0.588

Internal Conflict

0.638

0.625

Corruption

0.779

0.416

Law and Order

0.679

0.468

Bureaucracy Quality

0.771

0.421

Natural Resource Availability
Dummy Variable for Natural Resource Availability

Uncertainty Indicators
Exchange rate uncertainty

Overall Political Risk Index
Composite Political Risk

Political Instability Variables

Host Country Institutions
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Table 1.2 -- Expected Results
Variables
GDP growth
Inflation
Literacy Rate
Population ages 15-64 as a % o f total
Openness
Rate o f return on capital
Exchange Rates
Log # o f tel. lines per 1000 population
Natural Resource Availability
Exchange Rate Uncertainty
Overall Political Risk
External Conflict
Internal Conflict
Investment Profile
Corruption
Bureaucratic Quality
Law and Order

Expected Sign
ambiguous
negative
positive
positive
positive
positive
negative
positive
positive
negative
negative
negative
negative
negative
negative
negative
negative
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Table 1.3 -- ARCH/GARCH Models of the Log Difference of Exchange Rates
(Monthly)

Countries

Autoregrssive
process

Botswana

AR(1)

-

Burkina
Faso

AR(1)

—

Cameroon

AR(1)

—

Cote d'lvore

AR(1)

—

Egypt

AR(6)

—

Ethiopia

AR(1)

—

Gabon

AR(2)

M oving
Average
process

-

Ghana

AR(2)

MA(2)

GuineaBissau

AR(4)

—

Kenya

AR(2)

MA(1)

Mali

AR(4)

~

c
0.0007
(0.0002)***
0.0024
(0.0003)***
0.0024
(0.0005)***
0.0014
(0.0040)
0.0002
(0.0033)
0.0026
(0.0001)***
0.0941
(0.0150)***

ai
0.3030
(0.1266)***
-0.0048
(0.0324)
0.0035
(0.0811)
0.0011
(0.0469)
0.4392
(0.0515)***
-0.0030
(0.0903)
0.8381
(0.0055)***

0.0033
(0.0005)

1.1023
(0.2680)***

0.0015
(0.0022)
0.0001
(0.00002)
0.0007
(0.0001)***

0.0055
(0.0024)**
0.3698
(0.0599)***
0.1606
(0.9179)

Malawi

AR(3)

--

Morocco

AR(1)

-

Niger

AR(1)

-

0.0004
(0.0002)*
0.0005
(0.0001)***
0.0027
(0.0001)***

--

0.0101
(0.0003)***

0.0232
(0.0107)**
0.0165
(0.0538)
0.0370
(0.0708)
0.1847
(0.6458)

0.0014
(0.0025)
0.0001
(0.0003)***
(0.00003)
(0.00001)**
0.00004
(0.00001)
0.0004
(0.0004)***

0.2562
(0.0439)***
0.1615
(0.0483)***
0.1684
(0.0354)***
0.1912
(0.0398)***
0.1675
(0.0254)***

Nigeria

AR(1)

Sierra Leone

AR(6)

—

South Africa

AR(6)

—

Togo

AR(4)

—

Uganda

AR(4)

MA(2)

Zambia

AR(3)

—

a2
-

8/
0.6186
(0.0588)***

—

—

—

—

—
—

0.4070
(0.0154)***

—
—
—
—

0.8914
(0.0050)***
0.5863
(0.0198)***
0.7839
(0.0048)***
0.6089
(0.0402)***

—

0.8961
(0.0544)***

-

-

-

-

—
—
—
—
—
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0.8383
(0.0209)***
0.7289
(0.0650)***
0.8287
(0.0256)***
0.8446
(0.0165)***
0.8071
(0.0107)***

Figure 1.1 -- Conditional Variances of the Exchange Rates
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Figure 1.1 - Continued
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C2

04

06

Table 1.4 —Fixed Effects Estimation Results Using Overall Political Risk Indicator
Dependent Variable: Real FDI/GDP
Variable
GDP Growth
Inflation
Openness
Exchange Rates
Literacy Rate
Economically Active Population
The Number o f Telephone Lines per Capita
Rate o f Return on Investment
Natural Resource Availability
GARCH
Investment Profile
Composite political risk

(1)
-0.3612
(0.3028)
-1.0486
(0.5545) ***
0.0298
(0.0121)***
-0.4128
(0.4830)
0.1519
(0.0721)**
0.07026
(0.1158)
0.0036
(0.0050)
1.1232
(1.0569)
0.1816
(1.1494)
-0.0786
(0.0455)*
-0.1048
(0.0315) ***
-0.3921
(0.2328)*
-

GARCH * Composite political risk

—

Observations
Countries
R Squared within

240
12
0.1761

(2)
-0.3774
(0.3021)
-1.4251
(0.5536)***
0.0310
(0.0121) ***
-0.4163
(0 .4815)
0.1519
(0.0719)**
0.0525
(0.1160)
0.0032
(0.0050)
1.2959
(1.0599)
0.1495
(1.1461)
-0.0736
(0.0438)*
-0.10310
(0.0314)***
-0.3748
(0.2385)*
0.1687
(0.0170)
240
12
0.1843

Notes:
Standard Errors are in parenthesis and ***, ** and * denote significance at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels
respectively
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Table 1.5 ~ Fixed Effects Estimation Results Using Particular Measures of Political
__________________ Instability and Host Country Institutions___________________
Dependent Variable: Real FDI/GDP

Variable
GDP growth
Inflation
Openness
Exchange Rates
Literacy Rate
Econ Active
Popn.
Telephone Lines
Rate o f Return
GARCH
Natural Resource
Investment
Profile
External Conflict
Internal Conflict
Corruption
Law and Order
Bureaucr. Quality
garch * ext
conflict
garch * int
conflict
garch *
corruption
garch * law &
order

(2)

(1)
-0.2338
(0.3150)
-0.1463
(0.0565)***
0.0314
(0.0111)***
-0.2996
(0.5014)
0.1663
(0.0745)**
-0.1791
(0.1478)
0.0002
(0.0055)
0.8897
(1.1632)
0.1031
(1.1629)
-0.0682
(0.0404)*
-1.2684
(0.3211)***
-0.2794
(0.3519)
0.1631
(0.2906)
-0.0273
(0.4589)
-0.3203
(0.4390)
-0.5473
(0.0641)***
-

—
—
—

—
-

(5)

(4)

(3)

-0.2116
(0.3177)
-1.2794
(0.5464)***
0.0354
(0.0127)***
-0.2794
(0.5040)
0.1565
(0.0792)**
0.1362
(0.1543)
0.0005
(0.0056)
1.4112
(1.1380)
0.1543
(1.1693)
-0.05114
(0.0423)*
-1.2528
(0.3235)***
-0.3640
(0.3843)
0.2203
(0.3046)
-0.07826
(0.4679)
-0.3922
(0.4496)
-0.5971
(0.0648)***
-0.9769
(1.9719)
-0.5897
(0.9284)
-

-0.2430
(0.3132)
-1.2629
(0.5720)***
0.0328
(0.0126)***
-0.3598
(0.4994)
0.1475
(0.0782)
0.0900
(0.1529)
0.0007
(0.0055)
1.1289
(1.1210)
0.1471
(1.1561)
-0.0349
(0.0172)***
-1.2316
(0.3198)***
-0.2419
(0.3504)
0.0522
(0.2948)
-0.1636
(0.4618)
-0.4198
(0.4396)
-0.8041
(0.0656)***

-0.2606
(0.3028)
-1.3545
(0.5439)***
0.0366
(0.0121)***
-0.1384
(0. .4926)
0. 1847
(0.0751)***
0.1495
(0.1459)
0.0045
(0.0054)
1.3177
(1.0804)
0.0683
(1.1183)
-0.0461
(0. 0325)*
-1.2636
(0.3086)***
-0.3385
(0.3486)
0.2091
(0.2795)
-0.1989
(0.4442)
-0.4414
(0.6169)
-0.1415
(0.0554)***

-0-.2430
(0. 3132)
-0.1262
(0.0545)***
0.0328
(0.0108)***
-0.3597
(0.4993)
0.1908
(0.0759)**
0.1563
(0.1357)
-0.0016
(0.0052)
1.2972
(1.0854)
0.1471
(1.1561)
-0.0635
(0.0275)***
-1.1276
(0.0303)***
-0.2906
(0.3518)
-0.2571
(0.2748)
-0.1074
(0.4299)
-0.4063
(0.4230)
-0.1163
(0.0567)***

-

-

-

-

~

-

-

~

-

-

-

-

-0.9683
(0.5158)*

—

~

-

-

-

-

~

0.3383
(0.0793)***

—
—

-0.9683
—
—
—
—
(0.5158)*
garch * Bur Qual.
240
Observations
240
240
240
240
12
12
12
12
12
Countries
0.2046
R Squared within
0.1936
0.1936
0.2046
0.2564
Notes: Some o f the interaction terms are highly correlated among each other. The variables that are
correlated to each other are added singly to the regression. Standard Errors are in parenthesis and ***, **
and * denote significance at 0.01, 0.05, and O.lOlevels respectively
—

—

—

—
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Table 1.6 - Arellano-Bond GMM Estimation Results Using Overall Political Risk
In d icato r
Dependent Variable: Real FDI/GDP
Variables

(1)
0.1491
(0.0698)***
-0.1148
(0.3990)
-1.6099
(0.7288)**
0.0315
(0.0134)***
-0.1010
(0.0800)
0.1240
(0.1100)
0.1571
(0.1489)
0.0030
(0.0068)
0.3515
(1.4678)
0.4882
(1.9354)
-0.0839
(0.0546)*
-1.0078
(0.3376)***
-0.2040
(0.1711)

(2)
0.1411
Lagged FDI
(0.0726)***
-0.1257
GDP growth
(0.3994)
-1.5003
Inflation
(0.7331)**
0.0356
Openness
(0.0136)***
-0.3012
Exchange rates
(0.8195)
0.1403
Literacy Rate
(0.1106)
0.1542
(0.1491)
Economically Active Population
0.0010
The Number o f Telephone Lines per
(0.0069)
Capita
0.5798
(1.4700)**
Rate o f Return on Investment
0.4489
(1.9394)
Natural Resource Availability
-0.0758
(0.0453)*
GARCH
-0.9499
Investment Profile
(0.3398)***
-0.2037
(0.1053)*
Composite political risk
- -0.1848
—
(0.1075)*
GARCH * Composite political risk
216
Observations
216
12
12
Countries
0.1055
Sargan test
0.1375
0.6902
0.9045
Second Order Serial Correlation Test
Notes: Standard Errors are in parenthesis and ***, ** and * denote significance at 0.01, 0.05,
and 0.10 levels respectively. The null hypothesis for the Sargan test is that the instruments
are valid (the reported values are p-values). The null hypothesis for the second order serial
correlation test is that the errors don’t exhibit second order serial correlation (the reported
values are p-values).
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Table 1.7 -- Arellano-Bond GMM Estimation Results Using Particular Measures of
______________ Political Instability and Host Country Institutions_______________
Variable
Lagged FDI
GDP growth
Inflation
Openness
Exchange Rates
Literacy Rate
Econ Active
Popn.
Telephone Lines
Rate o f Return
GARCH
Natural Resource
Investment
Profile
External Conflict
Internal Conflict
Corruption
Law and Order
Bureaucratic qual
garch * ext
conflict
garch * int
conflict
garch *
corruption
garch * law &
order

(n
0.1202
(0.0731)*
-0.2537
(0.3046)
-1.5106
(0.7409)**
0.0287
(0.0150)***
-0.0949
(0.0820)
0.1207
(0.1106)
0.2716
(0.1775)
0.0068
(0.0064)
0.5966
(1.5692)
-0.3476
(0.1958)*
0.4277
(1.9791)
-1.0736
(0.3461)***
-0.1785
(0.4058)
-0.2489
(0.3005)
-0.3321
(0.5437)
-0.3086
(0.5023)
-0.3824
(0.0768)***
—
-

Denendent Variable:
121
0.1427
(0.0713)*
-0.2644
(0.3084)
-1.5376
(0.7505)**
0.0323
(0.0139)***
-0.0949
(0.0820)
0.1510
(0.1096)
0.2618
(0.1774)
-0.0012
(0.0069)
0.2505
(1.5553)
-0.2986
(0.1058)*
0.3513
(1.9879)
-1.0279
(0.3485)***
-0.0530
(0.4137)
-0.2139
(0.3023)
-0.3182
(0.5463)
-0.3833
(0.5073)
-0.3010
(0.0766)**
-0.4863
(0.4944)
-0.0629
(1.0896)

Real FDI/GDP
(3)
0.1223
(0.0726)**
-0.1972
(0.4363)
-1.5886
(0.0765)**
0.0302
(0.0139)***
-0.0934
(0.0825)
0.1231
(0.1105)
0.2716
(0.1775)
0.0013
(0.0069)
0.6495
(1.5646)
-0.3006
(0.1050)*
0.3586
(1.9829)
-1.0747
(0.3449)***
-0.0283
(0.4093)
-0.1682
(0.2949)
-0.3492
(-0.5427)
-0.3177
(0.5017)
-0.3826
(0.0768)***

(4)
0.1696
(0.0705)***
-0.1972
(0.4363)
-1.5886
(0.0765)**
0.0254
(0.0139)***
-0.1044
(0.0819)
0.1231
(0.1105)
0.2716
(0.1775)
0.00133
(0.0069)
0.6495
(1.5646)
-0.3454
(0.1558)*
0.8220
(1.8459)
-0.9887
(0.3205)***
-0.0283
(0.4093)
-0.1682
(0.2949)
-0.3492
(0.5427)
-0.3177
(0.5017)
-0.2190
(0.0742)***

151
0.1223
(0.0731)*
-0.1974
(0.4364)
-1.6025
(0.7637)**
0.0303
(0.0139)***
-0.2586
(0.0771)
0.1217
(0.1105)
0.2725
(0.1776)
0.0012
(0.0069)
0.6183
(1.5685)
-0.2111
(0.1081)*
0.3586
(1.9829)
-1.0784
(0.3463)***
-0.0369
(0.4089)
-0.1755
(0.2951)
-0.3438
(0.5436)
-0.3091
(0.5033)
-0.2816
(0.0771)***

—

—

-

- -

-

-

-

—

~

—

—

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-0.2135
(0.1704)

-

-

~

~

—

-

-

-0.2366
(0.0639)***

- -

-0.2694
garch * Bur qual.
—
—
—
—
10.0557)***
Observations
216
216
216
216
—
12
Countries
12
12
12
Sargan Test
0.1219
0.1556
0.1661
0.1219
0.0888
0.6704
Second Order
0.6543
0.6061
0.6704
0.6504
Notes: Some o f the interaction terms are prone correlated among each other; variables that are correlated
to each other are added singly to the regression. Standard Errors are in parenthesis and ***, ** and * denote
significance at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels respectively.
—

—

—

—
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CHAPTER II

EXCHANGE RATE UNCERTAINTY, POLITICAL RISK, AND PATTERNS OF
FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT (FDI): A COMPARISON ACROSS
DEVELOPING REGIONS

2.1

INTRODUCTION

Foreign direct investment (FDI)24 has become an increasingly important part o f
the global economy. FDI has a potentially significant impact on the recipient country’s
economy. First, it is less to crisis as opposed to short term credits and portfolio
investments, because direct investors, in general, have a long term perspective when
investing in a host country (see Lipsey, 1999). Second, because o f its long-term nature, it
has the potential to generate employment, raise productivity, transfer skills and
technology, and contribute to the long-term economic development o f the world’s
developing economies (UNCTAD, 2004). It also has the potential to provide capital
stocks and employment opportunities that may not be available in the host market, as
well as allowing for technology transfers from the developed to developing economies.
These potential benefits o f FDI over other types o f capital inflows, has made
attracting FDI one o f the integral parts o f economic development strategies and it is
therefore frequently advised that developing countries should primarily try to attract FDI
(see Bennassy-Quere et al, 2001 and Prasad et al., 2003). As a result, there is keen
competition among developing countries to attract foreign direct investment (FDI). Many
developing countries have adopted policies that are favorable to increase FDI inflows,
24

The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) defines foreign direct
investment (FDI) as an investment involving a long-term relationship and lasting interest in and control by
a resident entity in one economy in an enterprise resident in another economy. FDI may be undertaken by
individuals or by business entities. The ownership level required in order for a direct investment to exist is
10% o f the voting shares (UNCTAD, 2004).
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such as removing trade restrictions. Due to these factors, FDI to developing countries has
increased. In 2004 the share o f developing countries in world FDI inflows was 36%; the
highest level since 1997.
Asia is the largest recipient o f FDI inflows among developing regions. In contrast,
Africa still continues to be the region that receives the lowest inflow o f FDI despite the
fact that Africa has the highest rate o f return on investment when compared to other
developing regions. The average return on U.S FDI to Africa in the 1990’s was about
27% as compared with a return o f 17% for all developing countries (see Asiedu, 2002;
Harsch, 2005; and UNCTAD, 1995).25 Nevertheless, in 2004 Africa received 8% o f the
total FDI inflows to developing countries while Latin America received 29% and Asia
received about 63% (UNCTAD, 2005).

We are concerned with the unbalanced FDI

inflow patterns across developing regions. Why do FDI patterns differ so much across
these regions?26 In addition to the traditional determinants o f FDI such as infrastructure
development, market size or labor force availability and quality; do political risk

97

(political instability and institutional inefficiencies) and economic uncertainty play a role
in determining these patterns?
In order to evaluate strategies for the attraction o f FDI, it is important to
investigate if the economic and political uncertainties play an important role in impeding
FDI inflows in these developing regions. In this paper, we use data on FDI inflows for
Africa, Asia and Latin America to conduct a cross-region comparison in order to assess if
25 The rate o f return for Latin America was 16% while it was 24% for East Asia and the Pacific.
26 For example, in 2002 Africa received 1.7% o f all the FDI inflows while Latin America received 8.6%
(UNCTAD, 2004).
27
The concept o f political risk has not received a clear cut definition. However, for the purpose o f this
paper we will use the definition provided by Haendel (1979), who defines political risk as the risk or
probability o f occurrence o f some political event(s) that will change the prospects for the profitability o f a
given investment. Political risk captures political instability and host country institutional inefficiencies.
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there is a differential impact o f risk and uncertainty on FDI inflows to African countries.
The purpose o f this study is to investigate and compare how economic uncertainty and
political risk affect FDI flows to African, Asian and Latin American economies. It is
aimed at shedding some light on how to help African economies attract FDI.
This study contributes to the literature in two ways. First, we do a cross region
comparison on the impacts o f risk and uncertainty on FDI inflows into developing
regions. To the best o f our knowledge, there is no study attempting to do a cross-region
comparison on the effects o f political risk and economic uncertainty. Second, we employ
parametric as well as semiparametric analysis. We use non-linearity tests (such as the
Ramsey regression equation specification error test (Reset)) for non-linearity in the
political risk and economic uncertainty variables. The null hypothesis o f linearity is
rejected therefore we treat these variables as non-linear. We use a semiparametric
approach in order to account for the non-linearity in the risk and uncertainty variables.

2.2 FDI TRENDS AND LITERATURE REVIEW
2.2.1 F D I Trends in Africa, Asia, and Latin America
Africa’s share o f FDI to developing countries has decreased over time, from about
19% in the 1970’s to 9% in the 1980’s and to about 2-3% in the 1990’s (Asiedu, 2006).
During the 1990’s many developing countries including countries in Africa, adopted
policies that are favorable to increase FDI inflows such as removing trade restrictions and
providing sound economic policy environments. Due to these factors, FDI to developing
countries increased. By 2004 the share o f developing countries in world FDI inflows was
36%; the highest level since 1997. However, the same year FDI inflows to Africa
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remained nearly the same at about 3% o f world FDI inflows, while all other regions
experienced a significant increase (WIR28, 2005). In general, FDI to African countries
still remains small when compared to other developing regions. Needless to say; Africa
lags behind other developing regions in attracting FDI. In addition, very few countries in
Africa dominate FDI inflows into the region. The three largest recipients o f FDI in Africa
are Angola, Nigeria and South Africa (World Bank, 2004).
Similarly, FDI flows into Latin America do not have equal magnitude to the
various countries in the region. Two countries dominate as FDI recipients in Latin
America; Mexico and Brazil. However, unlike African countries, during the mid 1980’s
to the late 1990’s, FDI flows to Latin America grew tremendously. By 1998, six o f the
top twelve countries receiving FDI in 1998 were from Latin America. The strength o f the
region’s economy, increasing efforts to attract FDI and privatization programs were
among the key factors influencing rising levels o f FDI (UNCTAD, 1998). There was a
St

slowdown in these inflows at the beginning o f the 21 century. Latin America’s share o f
FDI to developing countries decreased from about 44% in the 1998 to 29% in 2004.
However, FDI still remains important in the region and has begun to grow from 2004 to
2005.
FDI is also very important to Asian economies. Economies in developing Asia
received increasingly larger shares o f world FDI inflows beginning in the 1990s, but the
Asian economic crisis temporarily reversed this trend. However, by 2004, FDI East Asia
was the preferred target, with a 46% increase in FDI inflows. By 2004, Asia was

28 World Investment Report, 2005.
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attracting nearly one in four global FDI dollars compared to attracting only one in ten in
2000 .
2.2.2 F D I and its Determinants
Location specific economic factors such as the size o f the market measured by the
GDP o f the host country, the availability o f labor, labor costs, inflation, and the
availability o f natural resources have been found to affect FDI inflows. Indeed, the
empirical literature cites a large number o f very different location specific economic
factors that impact investments associated with individual locations. However, in order
for investors to feel safe about their investments in developing countries, it is believed
that stable macroeconomic, political and social institutions should be in place. The ICC
(International Chamber o f Commerce)29 confirms that political instability; bureaucratic
bottle-necks and absence o f proper legal framework are the major factors which investors
see as impediments to FDI in developing countries. However, most studies ignore the
importance o f uncertainty that emanates from macroeconomic variables (such as
exchange rates) as well as political risks that affect FDI inflows. Recently, studies have
begun to focus on the impact o f political risk on capital flows to developing countries.
2.2.2.1 Political Risk and FD I
For obvious reasons, political risk is believed to negatively affect the M NEs’
decisions to invest in a foreign country. The volatility in the political environment o f the
host market increases the perceived risk and uncertainty experienced by the MNE. This
perception discourages MNEs from entering a host market through FDI. This is because

29 The ICC (International Chamber o f Commerce) is a global business organization that covers a broad
spectrum, from arbitration and dispute resolution to making the case for open trade and the market
economy system, business self-regulation, fighting corruption or combating commercial crime.
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the occurrence o f political and institutional instability will significantly affect firms’ costs
o f operating in a host country. However, empirical evidence is mixed on the effects o f
political risk on FDI inflows. Some studies show weak or no effect o f political risk on
FDI inflows. For example, Wheeler and Mody (1992) find political risk to be
insignificant in explaining U.S. FDI. Conversely, Biswas (2002) and Jun and Singh
(1996), find that political risk decreases FDI inflows. In particular, political risk
indicators such as internal armed conflict, political strikes, riots, and external conflicts
have been found to deter FDI inflows (see Nigh, 1985 and Schneider and Frey, 1985).
With regards to the impact o f political risk on FDI inflows to specific developing
regions such as Africa, Asia and Latin America, empirical research is limited (for
exceptions, see Asiedu, 2002 and 2006, Lemi and Asefa 2003, Hamori and
Razafimahefa, 2005, Tuman and Emmert, 2004, and Sokchea, 2006). Lemi and Asefa
(2003), argue that there is a differential effect o f instability on different industries due to
the nature, size and objectives o f the FDI firms that enter African economies. Tuman and
Emmert (2004) examine the political and economic determinants o f U.S. FDI in Latin
America. This study finds political instability to have a statistically significant effect on
the investment behavior o f U.S. multinational firm s. Surprisingly, another finding is that
poor human rights record and military coups d'etat positively influenced U.S. FDI flows.
One study that focuses on political risk and FDI to Asia is that o f Sokchea (2006). This
study finds political instability reduces FDI inflows into 10 Asian econom ies.30
In this paper we make use o f the political risk index provided by International
Country Risk Guide (ICRG) in order to study the effects o f political risk on FDI inflows

30 These countries include, China, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, South Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines,
Singapore, Taiwan, and Thailand.
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into developing economies. The ICRG provides overall country political risk indices as
well as particular measures o f political instability and host country institutions. We
employ the overall political risk index in order to measure the joint political and
institutional risk factors that investors face in these economies.
2.2.2.2 Exchange Rate, Exchange Rate Uncertainty, and FD I
The theoretical literature on FDI and exchange rates has led to a few different
points o f views. The traditional view argues that FDI is not related to the foreign
exchange market. Despite the assertions o f the traditional view, some studies have
directed the attention to the possible effects o f depreciations and appreciations o f the real
exchange rates on the location o f domestic and international investment flows. Studies
have argued that depreciation o f the foreign currency increases the relative wealth o f the
investing country and makes it profitable to invest offshore. This argument represents the
wealth position hypothesis that relates FDI to the foreign exchange markets through the
relative wealth o f the two countries. The other hypothesis is the relative labor cost
hypothesis, which indicates that the exchange rate affects FDI through relative labor
costs. In this case, a foreign country with a depreciating currency represents an
opportunity for lower labor costs. Most theoretical and empirical studies show that indeed
there is a relationship between FDI and exchange rates (see Cushman, 1988; Froot and
Stein, 1991; Blonnigen, 1997; Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo, 2001; Goldberg and Kolstad,
1995; and Goldberg and Klein, 1997).
The uncertainty o f exchange rates is also an important factor for investment
decisions. FDI Investors care about uncertainty because they look into the long term
horizon before undertaking any investments. Therefore, investment behavior will be
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responsive to the degree o f investment uncertainty about future prices, rates o f return, and
economic conditions (see Dixit and Pindyck, 1994). Empirical and theoretical literature
has not come to a consensus about the effects o f uncertainty on FDI. For example, if the
purpose o f FDI is to diversify location o f production (increase market share) and to have
the option o f production flexibility, then a positive relationship between uncertainty and
FDI is to be expected. On the other hand, if the purpose o f FDI were either to serve other
markets or bring production back to the home country, a negative relationship between
FDI and exchange rate uncertainty would arise (see Blonigen, 2005). Empirical work on
the effects o f exchange rate uncertainty and FDI inflows has concentrated on developed
economies. However, the studies that do focus on developing countries find a negative
relationship between uncertainty o f exchange rates and FDI inflows (see Bennassy-Quere
et al, 2001; Lemi and Asefa, 2003). A high degree o f uncertainty about exchange rates
might deter companies from making the initial investment in developing countries (see
Blonigen and Wang, 2004).
In the literature, exchange rate uncertainty has been proxied by a few different
measures. The future behavior o f an economic variable is uncertain since the probability
o f future events cannot be determined, a priori. Thus, the future volatility o f an economic
variable is seen as a stochastic process that evolves over time with a random and a
deterministic component. We can then define the uncertainty o f an economic variable as
the unpredictable portion o f its volatility (see Carruth et al., 2000). Both conditional and
unconditional measures o f volatility have been used in the literature in order to proxy
exchange rate volatility. A classic measure used to proxy volatility is the rolling variance,
which is an unconditional measure. In contrast to the unconditional variance o f a
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variable, conditional variance uses the previous information to measure volatility. As a
result, conditional measures such as the ARCH/GARCH processes are popular measures
o f volatility. In this study, we make use o f volatility o f the exchange rate generated from
ARCH/GARCH models in order to measure exchange rate uncertainty.

2.3 DATA
Our analysis covers 28 developing countries for the period 1989 through 2004.31
The variables used in this study are annual in frequency; however, the exchange rates
used to generate the conditional variances for the selected economies are monthly.32 The
data sources are the World Development Indicators, the International Financial Statistics
CD-ROM, and the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG). All variables except the
political risk indicators, host country institutions, the monthly exchange rates, and the
monthly consumer price indices, were retrieved from the World Bank’s World
Development Indicators. Both, the nominal exchange rate and the consumer price index
used to construct our real exchange rate variable were obtained from the International
Financial Statistics CD-ROM. The political risk indicators were taken from the ICRG
dataset.
Following the literature, our dependent variable is FDI inflows scaled by the GDP
o f each host country. Our independent variables can be grouped into different categories
such as macroeconomic variables, labor force availability and quality, natural resource

31 The countries in this study are Botswana, Egypt, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Malawi, Sierra
Leione, South Africa, Togo, Uganda, Zambia, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico,
Nicaragua, Pem, Venezuela, China, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and Sri Lanka. The
selection o f countries was based on data availability.
32 We aggregate the monthly conditional variances into annual frequency to obtain our annual uncertainty
measures.
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availability, infrastructure quality, investment profile, political risk indicator, and
exchange rate uncertainty measure.
The macroeconomic variables included in this study are GDP growth, inflation
rate, openness and exchange rates. The growth rate o f GDP measures the market potential
o f the countries used in this study. Some studies argue that FDI is attracted by potential
markets therefore it is important to control for market potential when analyzing the FDI
inflows. The inflation rate is included in our study in order to capture the macroeconomic
stability o f the economies in question. Moreover, as is common in the literature, openness
is captured by the share o f trade in GDP (that is, (X+M)/GDP). In the literature, some
studies use this variable as a measure o f trade restrictions. A firm investing in a foreign
country may import raw materials and semi-manufactured goods and export processed
commodities; therefore the host country’s trade policy might affect its investing
decisions. The inclusion o f the exchange rates is important in order to observe if the
depreciation o f the host country real exchange rate encourages FDI inflows into these
economies.
Labor force quality is captured by the literacy rate while labor force availability is
proxied by ratio o f economically active labor force (with ages between 15 and 64 to total
population). Infrastructure quality proxied by the number o f telephone lines per capita
has been found to affect FDI inflows to African economies (see W heeler and Mody,
1992), therefore we include a proxy for infrastructure development. In addition, a dummy
variable that takes account o f the presence o f natural resources (such as minerals or oil)
in the country is included since some FDI inflows are driven by natural resource
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availability. We also take account o f the rate o f return on investment by using log o f the
inverse o f the real GDP per capita (for explanations see Asiedu, 2002).
In addition to the variables mentioned above, measures for macroeconomic
uncertainty and political risk are included in our regressions. We use GARCH measures
o f the real exchange rates33 to proxy macroeconomic uncertainty as they are closer to
capture the concept o f foreign exchange uncertainty. On the other hand, the overall
political risk indices for each host country are used to proxy the political risk MNEs face.
The ICRG provides a composite political risk index (for each country) that is made up o f
particular components o f political instability as well as host country institutional quality.
The overall political index ranges from 0-100 where scores ranging from 0-49.9 imply
very high risk, 50-59.9 high risk, 60-69.9 moderate risk, 70-79.9 low risk and finally 80100 imply very low risk. However, to make the interpretation o f our results easier and
more intuitive, we rearrange the indices so that a high number implies high risk while a
low number implies a low risk.
Finally, a dummy variable is constructed to account for countries that are located
in Africa.

The dummy variable equals 1 if a country is located in Africa and 0

otherwise.34 This dummy is included to test whether countries in Africa on average
receive less FDI relative to countries in other regions. In addition, this dummy is
interacted with the exchange rate uncertainty variable as well as with the political risk
variable in order to test if risk and uncertainty affect African countries differently.

33 We use the real rather than the nominal exchange rate, since uncertain price levels as well as exchange
rates are relevant for long-term investments. All real exchange rates used in this chapter are bilateral
exchange rates vis-a-vis the U.S. dollar. The real exchange rates are calculated by multiplying the ratio o f
prices in the United States relative to national prices by the nominal exchange rates. Thus an increase in the
real exchange rate index would indicate an appreciation o f the U.S. dollar.
34 We also considered dummy variables for Asia and Latin America. However the coefficients for these
dummy variables were not significant. Therefore, we report only the results with the African dummy.
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2.4 ESTIMATION METHODOLOGY AND RESULTS
2.4.1 Exchange Rate Uncertainty Specification and Results
The ARCH/GARCH measure o f conditional volatility is used to account for the
effects o f exchange rate uncertainty. This measure involves obtaining the variance o f the
unpredictable part o f the series. This is done by first specifying a stochastic process for
the series, i.e., we develop a forecasting equation for the exchange rate based on an
information set. The forecasting equation is estimated to obtain the residuals and the
uncertainty measure is computed as the variance o f the estimated residuals. The
stochastic process that generates the predictable part can be any ARIMA (p, q) model.
Unlike the ad-hoc measures o f uncertainty such as rolling variances, the
ARCH/GARCH approach to estimating uncertainty is obtained on the basis o f an
estimated econometric model. It is often observed that this method captures volatility in
each period more accurately. The ARCH model characterizes the distribution o f the
stochastic error s t conditional on the realized values o f the set o f variables that may
include lagged values o f the conditional variance. The generalized ARCH model, namely
the GARCH (p, q) model is specified as follows:
Yt = f(xt; 8) + et

et/\|/t-i ~D(0, ht2).

(4.1.1)

(4.1.2)

where f (xt; 8) refers to the conditional mean, xt consists o f a vector o f explanatory
variables that may include lagged yt’s, 8 is a M xl vector o f parameters, vj/t_i is the
information set that contains all the information available through time t-1, and et is the
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error term which follows, conditional on v|/t.i, a D distribution. The conditional errors
•

•

2

•

•

have zero mean and time varying variance, ht . The conditional variance follows a
GARCH process as in (4.1.2). The conditional variance, hf the proxy for uncertainty, is
the one period ahead forecast variance based on the past information. It is a function o f
three terms: the mean level o f volatility a 0, the ARCH term35 s 2t_iand the GARCH
term/z;2_(. . 36
To generate measures o f uncertainty captured by ARCH/GARCH measures o f
conditional volatility, monthly real exchange rates for each o f the countries were used.
Before estimation o f our ARCH/GARCH models, we conducted some preliminary data
analysis such as checking for the presence o f unit roots. The results from the Augmented
Dickey Fuller (ADF) Test for unit roots suggest that the log o f the real exchange rates for
all the countries under consideration are 1(1) processes. That is, the real exchange rate for
each country has a unit root in levels while they are difference stationary. As a result, to
ensure the stationarity o f our variables, we use the first differences to fit ARCH/GARCH
models and to generate the conditional variances.
Table 2.1 presents the coefficients o f the GARCH (p, q) estimation. As can be
seen from Table 2.1, the coefficients o f the GARCH (p, q) have the theoretical signs and
magnitude. Once the monthly exchange rate uncertainty measures ( ht ) are obtained, they
are aggregated to produce annual series, and included into our regressions.

35 The ARCH term is the lag o f squared errors from the mean equation or news about volatility from the
previous period.
36 To ensure a well-defined process, all the parameters in the infinite order AR representation must lie
outside the unit circle. For a GARCH (1,1) process this will be the case if cq and 5i are non-negative. It is
also required that

a x+Sl < 1 for covariance stationarity.
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2.4.2 Parametric and Semiparametric Models and Results
In this paper we make use o f parametric as well as semiparametric analysis. First,
we estimate pooled and panel data parametric models. Panel data parametric estimation
such as the fixed effect model takes the country-specific heterogeneities o f the 28
countries into account. In addition, the fixed effect estimation includes the countryspecific effects as regressors rather than assigning them to the error term, thereby
reducing omitted variable bias. However, in addition to a fixed effects model, we also
employ the Arellano-Bond dynamic panel GMM estimator. Some studies have found
lagged FDI to be highly significant in their regressions (see, Gastanaga et al (1998) and
Busse and Hefeker (2005)). That is, FDI in the previous period might be relevant for FDI
in the current period. MNEs might be more attracted by host countries that already have
considerable FDI inflows, since having considerable FDI inflows might signal success o f
other MNEs. Therefore it is important to include the lagged dependent variable into our
regressions. The Arellano-Bond GMM dynamic panel estimator includes the lagged
dependent variable as an additional regressor and therefore addresses the problem o f
autocorrelation o f the residuals.
This estimator also deals with the fact that some o f the control variables are
endogenous. The fixed effect estimation assumes that all our regressors are exogenous.
However, this might not be realistic with some o f our regressors. In order to take the
endogeneity issue into account, we employ an instrumental variable type approach,
namely Arellano-Bond generalized method o f moments (GMM). One o f the basic
assumptions for applying the Arellano-Bond estimator is no second-order serial
correlation in the residuals o f the differenced specification. Therefore, before we employ
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the Arellano-Bond GMM dynamic panel estimator, we have to test for second order serial
correlation o f our residuals. In addition, the overall appropriateness o f the instruments
must be verified by a Sargan test o f over-identifying restrictions.
However, all o f the above mentioned parametric estimation methodologies make
assumptions about the functional form o f the regression function. Wrong assumptions
about the functional form o f the regression function may lead to misspecification bias and
result in misleading econometric conclusions if it is not consistent with the data.
Nonparametric estimation is a statistical method that allows the functional form o f a fit to
data to be obtained in the absence o f any constraints from theory. Nonparametric
estimation therefore allows the functional form o f the regression function to be flexible.
This type o f estimation also takes care o f misspecification bias.
First, we test37 for correct specification for a parametric model. However, we
could not reject the null hypothesis

for correctly specified parametric model. The next

step was to test if some o f the variables were nonlinear. As a result, we employ nonlinearity tests such as the Ramsey regression equation specification error test (Reset) for
non-linearity in the risk and uncertainty variables. The null hypothesis o f linearity is
rejected. Consequently, we use a semiparametric (partially linear) approach in order to
account for the non-linearity in the risk and uncertainty variables. The semiparametric
model takes care o f misspecification type bias, since we don’t assume any type o f
functional form for the variables that are non-linearly related to the independent variable.
The semiparametric model is specified as follows:
yit = xit (3+ m(zit) + ui t ..............................................................................

37 We implement a test implemented by Hsiao, Li & Racine (2003).
38 Under the null hypothesis, the test assumes that a parametric model is correctly specified.
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(4.3.1)

where i= l,...,n ; t= l,...,T and N=n*T. xlt is the vector o f parametric regressors, z;t is a
vector o f the nonparametric regressors, and m(.) is the gelneral functional form.39 Next
we take expectations conditional on z;t and estimate E (yit/zjt) and E (xjt/zjt)
nonparametrically. The estimated residuals from each o f the regressions are then used to
estimate the following parametric (linear) regression
yit* = xit * (3 + Ujt

(4.3.2)

.................

where yit* = yjt - E(yit| zit) and x it* = xit - E(xit| zit). The estimator for |3 is specified as
follows:
fi (X)=(X*’X*)"1(X*Y*).......................................................................

(4.3.3)

where X* is a NT*p matrix generated from Xit* and Y* is a NT*1 matrix generated from
yit*. Next we get the fitted values and estimate the following local linear non parametric
model.
(4.3.4)

yit = m(z) + a(z)(zit - z) uit
The estimator for a is specified as follows:
a

(X)=(Z’M K(z)MZ)'1(Z’MK(z)MY**)............................................

(4.3.5)

where K(z) is nT*nT diagonal matrix generated from k([zit -x]/h), where k(.) is the
kernel smoothing function, h is the window width. We use the standard normal kernel
and the optimal window width (that minimizes the mean squared error) for our estimation
purposes.
The parametric results namely the pooled, fixed effects and Arellano-Bond
dynamic panel GMM results are presented in tables 2.2, 2.3, and 2.4 respectively. In all
the tables, column 1 presents the base results (i.e. without the interaction terms between
39 We assume white noise errors.
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the African dummy and the political risk variable and between the African dummy and
the exchange rate uncertainty variable). And column 2 presents the results including the
above mentioned interaction terms.
The next phase o f results comes from the two separate semiparametric models we
estimate. In the first case, we assume political risk and exchange rate uncertainty to be
the nonparametric variables and in the second case the interaction terms between the risk
and uncertainty variables are assumed to be the nonparametric variables. Therefore,
figures 2.1 and 2.2 plot the point wise slope coefficients o f the regression o f political risk
on FDI inflows and o f exchange rate uncertainty on FDI inflows respectively. The second
case assumes nonparametric general form for the interaction terms o f the risk and
uncertainty variables with the African dummy. Plots for the regression coefficients o f the
interaction terms are presented in Figures 2.3 and 2.4. These results are also summarized
in table 5.
Tables 2.2, 2.3, and 2.4 present similar results in that, all the significant variables
have their expected signs. For example, the inflation rate has a negative sign and is
significant meaning that a high rate o f inflation can signal economic instability o f the host
country. The negative sign for inflation is supportive o f previous findings (see Asiedu,
2006). In addition, openness has the expected positive sign and is significant. If the MNE
imports raw materials and semi-manufactured goods and exports processed commodities,
then openness o f the country might positively affect its investing decisions. Previous
studies have also found measures o f openness to have a positive relationship with FDI
inflows (For results regarding measures o f openness, see Edwards, 1990 and Asiedu,
2003). Moreover, the rate o f return to investment has the expected positive sign and is
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statistically significant (for the pooled model). This result is in line with our expectations
that a high rate o f return to investment increases FDI inflows.
The main variables o f interest, our measures o f political risk and exchange rate
uncertainty variables are statistically significant and have the expected negative signs.
The negative and significant coefficient o f the GARCH measure o f uncertainty is
indicative o f a negative impact o f exchange rate uncertainty on FDI flows into
developing economies (such results are in line with Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo, 2001;
Lemi and Asefa, 2003; and Hamori and Razafimahefa, 2005). The MNE can ignore better
business opportunities in the host country if it expects a high variability o f the exchange
rate. Similarly the coefficient for the overall political risk index is negative as expected,
and is significant. Political risk creates an additional cost to investors; therefore one
would expect a negative relationship with FDI inflows.
The other variable o f interest, namely, the African dummy, is also negative and
significant implying that African countries on average receive less FDI relative to other
countries in other regions. The negative coefficient o f the Africa dummy shows that even
with the same levels o f openness, infrastructure and labor force quality, rate o f return on
investment, and other factors that determine FDI inflows, African countries on average
receive less FDI. This result is in line with that o f Asiedu (2002), who finds that countries
in Sub Saharan Africa receive 1.3 percent less FDI less than that o f a comparable country
outside the region.
The results in column 2 are very similar to the results in column 1 implying that
the addition o f the interaction terms has not changed the results by much. From column 2,
the variables o f interest are mainly the interaction terms. Both the interaction terms have
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a negative sign, but the interaction term between African dummy and exchange rate
uncertainty is not significant. The insignificance o f this interaction term implies that
exchange rate uncertainty does not have a differential impact on African countries. On
the other hand, the interaction term between political risk and African dummy is negative
and significant. This result implies that political risk has a differential effect on African
countries. That is, political risk affects FDI inflows into Africa more severely than FDI
into other developing regions (even after controlling for risk). This result is puzzling;
however, we can extend some explanations. One explanation could be the perception that
Africa is overly risky. As a result, a country in Africa will receive less FDI due to being
in Africa. Asiedu (2002) contends that this perception may be partly attributed to lack o f
knowledge about countries in the continent. She argues that one way to dispel this myth
is for governments to disseminate information about their countries and highlights the
importance o f international organizations such as the World Bank in playing an important
role in this regard.
Another explanation o f this puzzling result could be associated with the manner in
which political risk is measured. Rodrik et al (2004), points out that the most commonly
used institutional quality measures are based on surveys o f domestic and foreign
investors, thus capturing perceptions rather than any o f the formal aspects o f the
institutional setting. Therefore a possible extension o f this study could be to find
measures o f risk that capture the actual risk rather than the perception o f risk faced by the
MNE when investing through FDI.
Table 2.4 presents results from the Arellano-Bond dynamic panel GMM estimator
which includes the lagged dependent variable as an additional regressor. One o f the basic
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assumptions for applying the Arellano-Bond estimator is no second-order serial
correlation. For our data sample, the null-hypothesis o f no second order serial correlation
was not rejected. In addition, in order to account for the potentially endogenous variables,
we employ an instrumental variable type approach. The Arellano-Bond generalized
method o f moments (GMM) deals with the fact that some o f the control variables are
endogenous. Consequently, we verified the overall appropriateness o f the instruments by
a Sargan test o f over-identifying restrictions. The Sargan test results show that our
instruments are valid (see Table 2.4).
The justification for employing the Arellano-Bond dynamic panel GMM
estimator is that FDI in the previous period might be relevant for FDI in the current
period. This is because MNEs might be more attracted by host countries that already have
considerable FDI inflows, since having considerable FDI inflows might signal a success
o f other MNEs. As expected, table 2.4 shows that the lagged dependent variable (FDIt.i)
is significant and positive in all the specified models. This result implies that host
countries that already have considerable FDI inflows attract more FDI. Moreover, the
Arellano-Bond GMM estimation results are similar to the pooled as well as fixed effects
results. Control variables such as openness, investment profile (that measures contract
viability and ability o f multinationals to repatriate profits) and inflation still continue to
be consistently significant and continue to have their expected signs. Exchange rate
uncertainty (GARCH) and political risk also continue to be significant and negative.
These results imply that implementing sound and stable macroeconomic policies and
improving political environment (thereby reducing the political risk associated with
investing) may significantly increase FDI inflows into these economies. In addition, the
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interaction term o f the African dummy and political risk is negative and significant
meaning that there is a differential impact o f political risk on FDI inflows into African
countries.
The semiparametric results confirm that political risk is an important deterrent o f
FDI inflows into developing regions. Figures 2.1 and 2.2 plot the point wise slope
coefficients o f the regression o f political risk and exchange rate uncertainty on FDI
inflows (respectively). And Figures 2.3 and 2.4 plot the point wise slope coefficients o f
the interaction terms on FDI inflows. The 5% confidence bands are also shown in each
figure. These semiparametric results are summarized in table 2.5. The semiparametric
results (table 2.5 as well as figures 2.1-2.4) clearly show that the political risk variable
and its interaction with the African dummy are significant whereas the interaction term o f
uncertainty variable with the African dummy is not significant in all cases. Moreover,
these figures show an evidence o f non-linearity in the risk and uncertainty variables.
Therefore, the semiparametric approach used in this study is appropriate. This type o f
estimation takes care o f misspecification bias since we do not assume a linear functional
form for the variables that are nonlinear.

2.5 CONCLUDING REMARKS
This study investigates how economic uncertainty and political risk affects FDI
inflows to developing economies. We used data on FDI inflows for Africa, Asia and
Latin America to investigate the impacts o f risk and uncertainty on FDI inflows into these
regions. The results point to the fact that exchange rate uncertainty and political risk
reduce the FDI inflows into developing economies. Exchange rate uncertainty
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consistently exhibited negative and significant coefficients implying that exchange rate
uncertainty is a deterrent o f FDI inflows to these economies. The overall political risk
was similarly negative and significant implying that political risk discourages FDI
inflows.
In addition, we conducted a cross-region comparison in order to assess to what
degree each region is being affected by risk and uncertainty. The results show that
African countries receive less FDI compared to other developing countries even after
controlling for important determinants o f FDI. Moreover, it is shown that risk affects FDI
into Africa more severely than other developing regions. Results across specifications
point to the fact that African countries might be perceived to be overly risky. Therefore
these countries can increase FDI inflows by improving their institutional and political
environment thereby reducing the political risk associated with investing in their
countries. In addition, African countries could attempt to change their perception o f being
risky by publicizing the positive information about their countries.
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Table 2.1 -- ARCH/GARCH Models of the Log Difference of Exchange Rates
_____________________________ (Monthly)_____________________________

Countries
Botswana
Egypt

AR
Process

MA
Process

AR(1)
AR(6)

~~

Gabon

AR(2)

—

Ghana

AR(2)

MA(2)

Guinea-Bissau

AR(4)

Kenya

AR(2)

Malawi

AR(3)

Sierra Leone

AR(6)

South Africa

AR(6)

Togo

AR(4)

Uganda

AR(4)

Zambia

AR(3)

Argentina

AR(8)

MA(2)

Bolivia

AR(1)

MA(1)

Brazil

AR(3)

-

Colombia

AR(3)

-

Chile

AR(3)

-

Mexico

AR(3)

-

Nicaragua

AR(3)

-

Peru

AR(3)

-

Venezuela

AR(3)

-

China

AR(3)

-

India

AR(3)

-

Indonesia

AR(3)

-

Malasia

AR(3)

-

Philippines

AR(3)

-

Singapore

AR(3)

-

Sri Lanka

AR(3)

-

MA(1)

MA(2)

c
0.0007
(0.0002)***
0.0002
(0.0033)
0.0941
(0.0150)***
0.0033
(0.0005)
0.0015
(0.0022)
0.0001
(0.00002)
0.0004
(0.0002)*
0.0014
(0.0025)
0.0010
(0.0003)***
0.0003
(0.0001)**
0.0004
(0.0001)***
0.0040
(0.0004)***
0.0207
(0.0003)***
0.0005
(0.0010)
0.0182
(0.0082)***
0.0002
(0.0028)***
0.0008
(0.0008)
0.1900
(0.0035)***
0.0100
(0.0016)***
0.0100
(0.0005)***
0.0347
(0.0070)***
0.0952
(0.0065)***
0.0608
(0.0004)***
0.0003
(0.0026)***
0.00015
(0.0004)***
0.0038
(0.0011)***
0.0015
(0.0027)***
0.0025
10.00151**

0-1
0.3030
(0.1266)***
0.4392
(0.0515)***
0.8381
(0.0055)***
1.1023
(0.2680)***
0.0055
(0.0024)**
0.3698
(0.0599)***
0.0232
(0.0107)**
0.2562
(0.0439)***
0.1615
(0.0483)***
0.1684
(0.0354)***
0.1912
(0.0398)***
0.1675
(0.0254)***
1.8723
(0.1806)***
0.4171
(0.1041)***
0.4123
(0.1268)***
1.3555
(0.1381)***
0.1863
(0.4855)***
0.2592
(0.0385)***
0.0939
(0.0191)***
0.4452
(0.0584)***
1.8067
(0.4493)***
0.6114
(0.1532)***
0.3564
(0.0611)***
0.9719
(0.1834)***
0.6473
(0.1259)***
0.1882
(0.0624)***
0.3579
(0.1154)***
0.1846
10.0630)***
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a2
—
—

—

5/
0.6186
(0.0588)***
0.4070
(0.0154)***
0.8914
(0.0050)***

—

—
—

—
—

—
—

—

—

0.7839
(0.0048)***
0.6089
(0.0402)***
0.8961
(0.0544)***
0.8383
(0.0209)***
0.7289
(0.0650)***
0.8287
(0.0256)***
0.8446
(0.0165)***
0.8071
(0.0107)***

~

~

0.3618
(0.0805)***

—

—

—

—

—

—

0.0957
(0.1449)***
0.5799
(0.0514)***
0.9023
(0.0083)***
0.7181
(0.0119)***

—

—

—

—

—

—

~

_

. .

0.7629
(0.0245)***
0.1947
(0.0618)***
0.4508
(0.0654)***
0.7020
(0.0692)***
0.4900
(0.0934)***
0.7082
(0.11361***

Table 2.2—Pooled Model Estimation Results
Dependent Variable: Real FDI/GDP
Variable
African Dummy
GDP Growth
Inflation
Openness
Exchange Rates
Literacy Rate
Economically Active Population
The Number o f Telephone Lines per Capita
Rate o f Return on Investment
Natural Resource Availability
GARCH
Political risk

(1)
-0.1866
(0.0352)***
0.0590
(0.0960)
-0.0039
(0.0015) ***
0.0133
(0.0031)***
-0.0619
(0.0585)
0.0028
(0.0084)
0.0825
(0.0307)***
0.0202
(0.0015)***
0.1700
(0.0565)***
-0.0181
(0.2418)
-0.2545
(0.0729) ***
-0.7205
(0.1345)***
~

Interaction term between GARCH and
African Dummy
Interaction term between Political risk and
African Dummy

—
—

Observations
Countries
Adjusted R Squared

(2)
-0.4124
(0.0533)*
0.0665
(0.0960)
-0.0056
(0.0016) ***
0.0122
(0.0032)***
-0.0259
(0.0591)
0.0066
(0.0085)
0.1178
(0.0327) ***
0.0241
(0.0016) ***
0.1147
(0.0582)***
0.3606
0.2423
-0.0896
(0.0090)***
-0.4903
(0.1571)***
-0.1137
(0.1421)
-0.5238
(0.2071)***

448
28

448
28

0.5043

0.4703

Notes:Standard Errors are in parenthesis and ***, ** and * denote significance at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels
respectively.
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Table 2.3—Fixed Effects Parametric Results
Dependent Variable: Real FDI/GDP
Variable
African Dummy
GDP Growth
Inflation
Openness
Exchange Rates
Literacy Rate
Economically Active Population
The Number o f Telephone Lines per Capita
Rate o f Return on Investment
Natural Resource Availability
GARCH
Political risk
Interaction term between GARCH and
African Dummy
Interaction term between Political risk and
African Dummy

(1)
-0.2245
(0.1431)*
0.0516
(0.0265)
-0.0033
(0.0010) ***
0.0094
(0.0009)***
-0.3348
(0.3694)
0.0561
(0.0550)
0.0599
(0.0720)
0.0090
(0.0053)***
0.2278
(0.1108)***
0.0407
(0.1427)
-0.08967
(0.0402)***
-0.5903
(0.1572)***
—
—

Observations
Countries
R Squared within

448
28
0.1507

(2)
-0.2468
(0.1494)*
0.0562
(0.0269)***
-0.0045
(0.0014)***
0.0044
(0.0009) ***
-0.4464
(0.3780)
0.0377
(0.0553)
0.0494
(0.0729)
0.0115
(0.0055)***
0.3322
(0.1072)***
0.2070
0.1445
-0.0810
(0.0408)**
-0.2774
(0.0882) ***
-0.1620
(0.1339)
-0.4784
(0.2401)***
448
28
0.1274

Notes:
Standard Errors are in parenthesis and ***, ** and * denote significance at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels
respectively
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Table 2.4 -- Arellano-Bond GMM Estimation Results
Dependent Variable: Real FDI/GDP
Variable
Lagged FDI
African Dummy
GDP Growth
Inflation
Openness
Exchange Rates
Literacy Rate
Economically Active Population
The Number o f Telephone Lines per Capita
Rate o f Return on Investment
Natural Resource Availability
GARCH
Political risk
Interaction term between GARCH and
African Dummy
Interaction term between Political risk and
African Dummy

(1)
0.2842
(0.0517)***
-0.1473
(0.9955)***
0.0024
(0.0032)
-0.0067
(0.0018) ***
0 .0243
(0.0117)***
-0.0858
(0.3632)
0.0757
(0.0781)
0.0349
(0.0950)***
0.0006
(0.0053)
0.3155
(0.1144 )***
0.7488
(0.8923)
-0.2683
(0.1086)***
-0.1529
(0.0921)***
—

Observations
Countries
Sargan test
Second Order Serial Correlation Test

448
28
0.0955
0.3851

(2)
0.2723
(0.0524)***
-0.1539
(0.0993)*
0.0024
(0.0033)
-0.0067
(0.0017) ***
0.0128
(0.0117)***
-0.0664
(0.3642)
0.0859
(0.0778)
0.0256
(0.0964) ***
0.0021
(0.0055) ***
0.3432
(0.1139)***
0.8758
(0.8900)
-0.2134
(0.1096)***
-0.0811
(0.0971)***
-0.2996
(0.5754)
-0.5806
(0.3203)***
448
28
0.0837
0.3251

Notes: Standard Errors are in parenthesis and ***, ** and * denote significance at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10
levels respectively. The null hypothesis for the Sargan test is that the instruments are valid (the reported
values are p-values). The null hypothesis for the second order serial correlation test is that the errors
don’t exhibit second order serial correlation (the reported values are p-values).
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Table 2.5—Summary of Semiparametric Results

Variables
African Dummy
GDP Growth
Inflation
Openness
Exchange Rates
Literacy Rate
Econ Active Population
No. of Tel Lines per Capita
Rate o f Return on Investment
Natural Resource
GARCH
Political risk
African Dummy*Pol Risk
African Dummy*GARCH
Observations
Countries

Non-Linarity in
Political Risk
-0.1419
(0.0322)***
0.0498
(0.1001)
-0.0021
(0.0011)***
0.0069
(0.0029)***
-0.0092
(0.0215)
-0.0118
(0.0080)*
0.0399
(0.0266)***
0.0193
(0.0018)*
0.0866
(0.0430)***
0.1952
(0.2133)
-0.2290
(0.0766)***
-0.9644
(0.5471)**
-0.2293
(0.0766)***
-0.1249
(0.1025)
448
28

Non-Linarity in
GARCH
-0.3840
(0.2115)*
0.0615
(0.0964)
-0.0026
(0.0011)***
0.0072
(0.0028)***
-0.0359
(0.0119)
0.0028
(0.0078)
0.0453
(0.0269)**
0.0214
(0.0015)*
0.0660
(0.0399)***
0.0619
(0.2121)
-0.7112
(0.5215)
-0.3837
(0.0833)***
-0.2210
(0.0701)***
-0.1441
(0.1135)
448
28

Non-Linearity in
African
Dummy*Political
Risk
-0.1490
(0.0765)*
0.0681
(0.0985)
-0.0028
(0.0012)***
-0.0062
(0.0029)***
-0.0248
(0.0247)
0.0021
(0.0082)
0.0517
(0.0282)***
0.0238
(0.0015)
0.0631
(0.0442)
0.1308
(0.2171)
-0.2045
(0.0819)***
-0.4002
(0.1019)***
0.0578
(0.1194)
-8.0611
(5.5134)
448
28
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Non-Linearity in
African
Dummy*GARCH
-0.1274
(0.0766)*
0.0685
(0.0985)
-0.0031
(0.0011)***
0.0061
(0.0029)***
-0.0299
(0.0243)
0.0038
(0.0080)
0.0546
(0.0281)**
0.0238
(0.0015)***
0.0568
(0.0439)
0.1590
(0.2155)
-0.1216
(0.0806)**
-0.5641
(0.0119)***
0.1322
(0.0674)***
-1.0122
(0.7742)
448
28

Figure 2.1 —The Effect o f Political Risk on FDI40
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Figure 2.2 —The Effect o f Exchange Rate Uncertainty on FDI
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40 Where B represents the point wise regression coefficients o f political risk on FDI, and lowerCL and
upperCL represent the upper and lower confidence bands respectively
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Figure 2.3 —The Effect o f the Interaction Term o f the Political Risk and African Dummy
on FDI Inflows
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Figure 2.4 —The Effect o f the Interaction Term o f the Exchange Rate Uncertainty with
the African Dummy on FDI Inflows
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.06

CHAPTER III

THE IMPACTS OF RISK AND UNCERTAINTY ON REMITTANCES INTO LATIN
AMERICAN ECONOMIES

3.1

INTRODUCTION

Remittances41 have become an increasingly important and fast growing external
finance for many developing countries. In 2005, the share o f developing countries in
global remittances inflows was $167 billion. This amount had more than doubled from its
value o f $58 billion in 1995 (UN habitat, 2006). The increase in remittances flows into
developing regions is welcomed since remittances have a potentially significant impact
on the recipient country’s economy. First, remittances are a more stable source o f
external finance as opposed to capital flows which tend to rise during favorable economic
cycles and fall during less favorable ones. This countercyclical nature o f remittances
exerts a stabilizing influence, and thus helps insulate vulnerable countries from economic
shocks (Ratha, 2003 and Global Economic Prospects 2006). Moreover, remittances
increase the recipient country’s foreign exchange reserves and promote economic growth
if households use remittances for investment. If they are consumed, they can also
generate positive multiplier effects, offsetting some o f the output losses that a developing
country may suffer from emigration o f its highly skilled workers (Ratha, 2003: 164).
By 2005, Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) were the largest remittances
destination in the world, with inflows around $53.6 billion. This amount exceeded, for

41 Remittances are the portion of international migrant workers’ earnings sent back from the country of employment to
the country of origin. World Bank defines international flows of remittances as the sum o f three items, namely, worker
remittances, income (compensation) of migrant workers and migrant savings (the net wealth o f migrants when they
return home).
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the third consecutive year, the combined flows o f all net Foreign Direct Investment (FDI)
and Official Development Assistance (ODA) to the Region (Inter American Development
Bank, 2006). Because o f their increasing volume and their potential to reduce poverty
and enhance economic growth, remittances are receiving growing attention from
policymakers in the developing countries o f Latin America.
There is a wide range o f important issues related to remittances. In this study, we
focus on a very important issue, namely, the determinants o f remittances to Latin
American countries. Assuming that remittances have a positive effect on the recipient
economy, what are the determinants o f remittances into Latin American economies? The
remittances literature is divided into two broad categories. The first category o f
determinants deals with microeconomic determinants o f remittances such as the social
and demographic characteristics o f migrants and their families, while the second category
considers macroeconomic variables o f the sending as well as receiving countries. Our
study fits into the second category as we investigate the macroeconomic determinants o f
remittances into nine Latin American countries.42
When investigating the determinants o f remittances, it is important to recognize
that migrants have different motivations when sending money back to their native
countries. The remittances literature roughly distinguishes between an altruistic motive to
remit, a self-interest motive to remit (such as remittances sent to invest in the native
country), and a combination o f altruistic and self-interest motives. Generally, studies that
investigate the determinants o f remittances assume that migrants are risk neutral in their
preferences with respect to risk and return in that they do not include risk variables in

42 The countries employed in this study are: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Nicaragua, Peru, and
Venezuela. These countries were chosen due to data availability.
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their regressions (Higgins et al, 2004). In fact, remittances for investment would be
influenced by risk and return considerations. Ratha (2003) reviews cross-country studies
on remittances and reveals that remittances are affected by the investment climate in
recipient countries in the same manner that capital flows are; though to a lesser degree.
Therefore, determinants o f remittances in an investing framework would have to include
rates o f return to investment and the risk o f investing in the home (receiving) country
such as political risk and/or exchange rate uncertainty. However, to our knowledge, only
one study has considered risk variables as determinants o f remittances and no study has
used the rate o f return to investment measure43 that we use in this study (for the study
considering risk variables, see Higgins et al, 2004; for explanations about how to
construct the rate o f return to investment variable, see Aseidu, 2002).
In our study, we employ a measure o f political risk that captures multiple facets o f
risk faced by investors in the Latin American countries. We use the political risk index
from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) that measures the combined effects o f
political and institutional instabilities faced by investors. The ICRG is published by
Political Risk Services (PRS) and is used by investors, multinational corporations,
importers, exporters, and a multitude o f others, to determine how political risk might
affect their business and investments now and in the future (ICRG, 2006). We also
include a measure o f the rate o f return to investment as well as GARCH measures o f
exchange rate uncertainty to investigate the determinants o f remittances in addition to the

43

Most studies take account of the return to investment by using the interest rate differentials between the host and
home countries. In this study, we use the inverse o f the log o f GDP per capita to account for the rate of return to
investment. This substitution is made since market interest rates for most of the selected years are not available. In
addition, the reported interest rates in many of these countries do not reflect true asset returns (Higgins et al, 2004).
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traditional determinants o f remittances used by other studies. As a result, this paper
presents a more complete uncertainty analysis.
The purpose o f this paper is to examine the macroeconomic determinants o f
remittances such as income, inflation, exchange rates, exchange rate uncertainty, political
risk, and rate o f return to investment. Most importantly we investigate whether political
risk, exchange rate uncertainty, and the rate o f return to investment play a role in
determining remittances flows into Latin American countries.
Following this introduction, the rest o f the paper is organized as follows: section 2
discusses the trend o f remittances inflows to Latin American countries and provides a
brief literature review. Section 3 gives the sources o f data and describes the variables
used in the study. Section 4 outlines the empirical methodologies used in the study.
Section 5 discusses the empirical findings and finally, section 6 draws conclusions and
policy implications.

3.2 REMITTANCES TO LATIN AMERICA AND BRIEF
LITERATURE REVIEW
3.2.1 Remittances to Latin America
In 1995, the share o f remittances going to Latin America and the Caribbean
accounted for 23.2% o f the world total remittances. However by the year 2005 this
volume had increased to 31% o f world total remittances, making the region the main
remittance recipient region in the world. In dollar terms, Latin America and the
Caribbean received about $53.6 billion in remittance transfers in 2005. Out o f the $53.6
billion sent, an estimated $20 billion were sent to Mexico, nearly $6.4 billion were
destined to Brazil, and about $4.1 billion were sent to Colombia (Inter American
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Development Bank, 2006).44 In most Latin American countries, remittances have
exceeded official development assistance and capital inflows such as FDI (see Table 3.1).
There are some key factors that could explain the tremendous growth seen in
remittances inflows to Latin American countries over the last decade. One o f the most
important reasons has been the increase in emigration o f workers from Latin American
countries to regions with demand for labor such as the U.S. and Western Europe. The
Inter American Development Bank estimates that in 2005 over 25 million Latin
American bom adults were living outside their country o f origin. Out o f these 25 million
migrants, approximately 65% send money home on a regular basis. The amount o f
money they send is typically from $100 - $300 a month (Inter American Development
Bank, 2006).
The main origin o f remittances to Latin America is the U.S. as about 75% ($40
billion) o f Latin American remittances are sent from the U.S. The next largest source o f
remittances is Western Europe with remittances from there accounting for almost 15%
(about $7.5 billion) o f Latin American remittances.
3.2.2 Literature Review
There is a wide range o f important issues related to remittances. In this study, we
focus on the determinants o f remittances to Latin American countries. As mentioned
above, the literature is divided into two broad categories. The first category deals with
microeconomic determinants o f remittances such as the social and demographic
characteristics o f migrants and their families. The second category o f determinants,

44

Some studies support the claim that remittances are used for investment purposes in Latin American
countries. Woodruff and Zenteno (2001) show that remittances are responsible for about 1/5 o f the capital
invested in micro enterprises in urban Mexico.
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considers macroeconomic variables of the sending as well as receiving countries. Much
o f the remittances literature has focused on the first category which deals with
microeconomic determinants o f remittances (for example, see Lucas and Stark, 1985;
Russell 1986; Djajic, 1989; Hoddinot, 1992; Durand et al. 1996; Ilahi and Jafarey, 1999;
and Agarwal and Horowitz, 2002). In the literature, socio-demographic variables such as
the impacts o f household income, employment o f the migrant, marital status and gender
o f the migrant, number o f children at home, education level o f the migrant, occupation
level o f migrant, and the number o f years since migration, on remittances, among others
have been investigated. The income level o f the migrant, marital status, education level
and the number o f dependents have been found to be important determinants o f
remittances by a number o f studies (see Lucas and Stark, 1985 and Durand et al., 1996).
On the other hand, Hoddinot (1992) highlights the role o f the gender o f the migrant in
affecting the amount o f remittances sent.
The above mentioned demographic variables have also been used to test the
motives to remit. It is widely thought that altruism is an important motivation for
remitting. However, some studies have argued for other motives such as self-interest and
risk-sharing. Lucas and Stark (1985), use micro level data from Botswana to test several
hypotheses for motivations to remit. Their study shows that altruism alone is not a
sufficient explanation o f the motivations to remit to Botswana. On the other hand,
Agarwal and Horowitz (2002) test the altruism versus risk-sharing motives to remit and
found evidence supporting the altruistic motive.
However,

in

addition

to

the

demographic

variables

mentioned

above;

macroeconomic variables o f the sending and receiving countries would affect remittances
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flows. Therefore, some studies have recognized the importance o f the macroeconomic
determinants o f remittances (see for example, Straubharr, 1986; Faini, 1994; El-Sakka
and McNabb, 1999; Chami et al 2003; Higgins et al, 2004; and Vargas-Silva and Huang,
2006). These studies investigate the impacts o f home (receiving) and host (sending)
country variables such as inflation, income, exchange rates, wage levels, interest rates,
and interest rate differentials on remittances flows. Studies have found mixed evidence
on the impacts o f these variables on remittances flows.
For example, a higher foreign interest rate compared to the domestic rate (a high
premium) is expected to discourage remittances flows. However, Straubhaar (1986) using
data of remittances from Germany to Turkey finds that interest rate differentials between
the host and home countries have no effect on remittance flows. Similarly, Elbadawi and
Rocha (1992), using data from Western Europe and North Africa find the interest rate
differential to have no significant impact on remittances. Alternatively, Katselli and
Glytsos (1986) and El-Sakka and McNabb (1999) argue that interest rates and interest
rate differentials significantly affect remittances inflows into Greece and Egypt
respectively.
Looking at the impact o f exchange rates on remittances; most studies expect the
depreciation o f the real exchange rate to encourage the flow o f remittances from the host
to home country (Higgins et al, 2004). This expectation is supported by Chandavarkar
(1980), Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo (2004), and Higgins et al (2004) who find exchange
rates to be important in determining remittances inflows. In addition, Higgins et al.
(2004) find that exchange rate volatility (a measure o f risk) is an important determinant
o f remittances.
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It is usually believed that higher inflation rates o f the host country will increase
the flow o f remittances. On the contrary, high inflation rates in the home country
decrease remittances inflows due to the relative increase in prices o f goods and assets at
home. In addition, a high inflation rate is a discouraging signal for investment and
therefore leads to a decrease in remittances into the home country. Elabadawi and Rocha
(1992) find results that are supportive o f this hypothesis and show that high inflation rates
in the home country decrease remittances inflows. However, El-Sakka and McNabb
(1999) find that high rates o f inflation in the home country may encourage remittances
especially in low-income countries where a migrant’s family may depend significantly on
remittances as source o f income.
The macroeconomic variables mentioned above have also been used to test the
altruistic versus self-interest motive for remitting. If downturns in the receiving economy
prompt workers to increase remittances to their home countries, then their motives can be
thought o f as altruistic. If on the other hand, immigrant workers are self-interested,
remittances will respond positively to economic conditions in the receiving country. Faini
(1994) and Glytsos (1997), using income to measure the economic condition o f the
receiving country, find that workers motives are altruistic since downturns in the home
economy prompt workers to increase the amount they remit. Alternatively, Higgins et al
(2004) find evidence for the investment or self-interest hypothesis since they find
favorable economic conditions at home increase remittances inflows into the home
country.
Moreover, macroeconomic determinants can also be used to test if remittances
respond more to changes in the economic conditions o f the sending country than to
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changes in the economic conditions o f the receiving country. Straubhaar (1986) using
data o f remittances from Germany to Turkey finds that only variables like the wage level
in Germany are significant in affecting remittances flows. Similarly, Vargas-Silva and
Huang (2006) using data from U.S. to Latin American countries find that remittances
respond more to changes in the macroeconomic conditions o f the host country (U.S.),
than to changes in the macroeconomic conditions o f the receiving country.
Our study fits into the literature since we investigate the macroeconomic
determinants o f remittances such as income, inflation, exchange rates, exchange rate
uncertainty, political risk, and rate o f return to investment. This study contributes to the
literature since we analyze if the rate o f return to investment, political risk and exchange
rate uncertainty play a role in determining remittances flows into Latin American
countries.

3.3 DATA DESCRIPTION
As mentioned above, our analysis covers 9 Latin American countries45 for the
period 1985 through 2005. The variables used in this study are annual in frequency;
however, the exchange rates used to generate the conditional variances are m onthly46
The data sources for our variables are the W orld Development Indicators (WDI), the
International Financial Statistics (IFS) CD-ROM, U.S. Census data, Immigration and
Naturalization Services (INS) statistical yearbook, and the International Country Risk
Guide (ICRG). All variables except the political risk indicators, monthly exchange rates,
and monthly consumer price indices were retrieved from the World Bank’s World
The selection o f the LAC was based on data availability.
We aggregate the monthly conditional variances into annual frequency to obtain our annual volatility
measures.

45
46
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Development Indicators (WDI). Both the nominal exchange rate and the consumer price
index used to construct our real exchange rate variable were obtained from the
International Financial Statistics (IFS) CD-ROM. The political risk indicators were taken
from the ICRG dataset.
Some problems exist in the measurement o f remittances. One o f the problems is
that there is no consensus on the boundaries o f the phenomenon under study, i.e. should
only workers’ remittances be counted, or should compensation o f employees and migrant
transfers be included as well (Ratha, 2003). In this study, we use the definition o f migrant
remittances used by The World Bank, which is the sum o f workers’ remittances,
compensation o f employees, and migrant transfers.
Another problem arises because many types o f formal remittances flows go
unrecorded due to weakness in data collection (Jongwanich, 2007). For example, money
flows through informal channels such as money transfers through family members are
rarely computed. If remittances sent through informal channels are included in official
remittances data, total remittances could be as much as 50% higher than the official
record (World Bank, 2006).
Moreover, the available data on remittance flows does not identify the source
country o f these flows. However, remittances literature identifies the sending as well as
receiving country’s macroeconomic variables as being important determinants o f
remittances. To incorporate both the sending and receiving countries’ macroeconomic
variables, we use data from Latin American countries since 75% o f Latin American
remittances are sent from the U.S. For this reason, for Latin American countries, it is
reasonable to assume that the error is small.
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In order to investigate the determinants o f remittances into Latin American
countries, we use the following variables: remittances per immigrant47 (REM),
remittances flows (REMF), stock o f immigrants in the U.S. (for each Latin American
country) (IMMI), per capita income o f each o f the 9 Latin American countries (Y),
median Hispanic income in the U.S. (MHI), real exchange rate (XR), rate o f return to
investment (RR), exchange rate uncertainty (GARCH), and political risk (POLRISK).
The median Hispanic income in the U.S. (MHI) is used to measure economic well
being o f migrants in the host (sending) country.48 An increase in the income o f migrants
(i.e. an improvement in their well-being) is expected to increase remittances sent by these
migrants to their native countries. Other studies have used the host country’s GDP as well
as the unemployment rate o f the host country to measure the economic well being o f
migrants in the sending country. Similarly, the per capita incomes (Y) o f the 9 Latin
American countries are used to measure the economic well-being o f the home (receiving)
countries. Previous studies suggest that the home country’s GDP per capita may affect
remittances either positively or negatively, depending on different motives to remit. If the
motive for remitting is to invest then there will be a positive relationship between per
capita income in the receiving country and remittances inflows. However, if the motive is
altruistic then a negative relationship is to be expected. Conversely, the stock o f
immigrants (IMMI) in the host country is expected to have a positive relationship with

The stock o f immigrants in the U.S. for each o f the sample country was constructed from U.S. Census
data and annual data on U.S. immigration flows from each o f the sample countries.
48 Most studies use U.S. GDP to measure the economic well being o f the migrants. However, MHI more
closely maps the U.S. income o f this group. MHI measures income o f Hispanic households (migrant and
U.S. nationals) in the U.S (Loser et al, 2006).
47
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remittances flows, that is, an increase in the number o f immigrants in the host country
will increase the money sent back home.
Host country inflation (INF) will increase the flow o f remittances as immigrant
workers seek to protect against the decrease in their purchasing power in the host
country. Therefore, a negative relationship between host country inflation and
remittances is to be expected. However, home country inflation (INFHOME) may affect
remittances either positively or negatively. If investment is the main motive to remit, then
effect o f the inflation o f the home country on remittances would be negative. However, if
altruism is the main motive to remit, opposite results could be obtained. The real
exchange rate (XR) also has the potential to affect remittances. The depreciation o f the
real exchange rate is expected to encourage the flow o f remittances from the host to home
country (Higgins et al, 2004). Some studies highlight the fact that some governments in
developing countries have devalued the exchange rates in order to encourage remittances
inflows (Wahba, 1991).
In addition to the variables mentioned above, measures for rate o f return (RR) to
investment, macroeconomic uncertainty (GARCH), and political risk (POLRISK) are
included in our regressions. Most studies take account o f the RR by using the interest rate
differentials between the host and home countries. However, we take account o f RR by
using log o f the inverse o f the real GDP per capita (for explanations o f how to construct
this variable see Asiedu, 2002). This substitution is made since market interest rates for
most o f the selected years are not available. In addition, the reported interest rates in
many o f these countries do not reflect true asset returns (Higgins et al, 2004). Therefore
we use our measure o f the rate o f return to investment. The rate o f return to investment is
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expected to have a positive relationship with remittances inflows if the motive to remit is
for investment. On the other hand, GARCH measures o f the real exchange rates49 are
used to proxy exchange rate uncertainty. Increases in exchange risk will decrease the
level o f remittances assuming that a part o f these flows in fact are private investment
flows made by immigrants (Higgins et al, 2004).
The overall political risk indices (POLRISK) for each host country are used to
proxy the political risk prevailing in the countries. The ICRG provides a composite
political risk index (for each country) that is made up o f particular components o f
political instability as well as host country institutional quality. The unpredictability and
volatility in the political environment o f the home country increases the perceived risk
and uncertainty experienced by the migrant. As a result, a negative relationship between
political risk and remittances inflows is to be expected.

3.4

ESTIMATION METHODOLOGY AND RESULTS

3.4.1. Exchange Rate Uncertainty Specification and Results
The ARCH/GARCH model has become a popular method to study volatility
(Engle, 1982; Bollerslev, 1986). The ARCH/GARCH measure o f uncertainty involves
obtaining the variance o f the unpredictable part o f the series. Unlike the ad-hoc measures
o f uncertainty such as rolling variances, the ARCH/GARCH approach is obtained on the
basis o f an estimated econometric model. It is often observed that this method captures
volatility in each period more accurately. The ARCH model characterizes the distribution

49 We use the real rather than the nominal exchange rate, since uncertain price levels as well as exchange
rates are relevant for long-term investments. All real exchange rates used in this chapter are bilateral
exchange rates vis-a-vis the U.S. dollar. The real exchange rates are calculated by multiplying the ratio o f
prices in the United States relative to national prices by the nominal exchange rates. Thus an increase in the
real exchange rate index would indicate an appreciation o f the U.S. dollar.
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o f the stochastic error e t conditional on the realized values o f the set o f variables that
may include lagged values o f the conditional variance. The generalized ARCH model,
namely the GARCH (p, q) model is specified as follows:
e,/V,., ~D(0, h,2)..............................................................

(4.1,1)

hf = a 0 + f i a le l , + f i S ih l i, .....................................................................

(4.1.2)

Yt - f(xt; 5) + et

i= l

i= \

where f (xt; 8) refers to the conditional mean, xt consists o f a vector o f explanatory
variables that may include lagged yt’s, 8 is a M xl vector o f parameters, \|/t-i is the
information set that contains all the information available through time t-1, and et is the
error term which follows, conditional on i|/t_i, a D distribution. The conditional errors
have zero mean and time varying variance, h,2. The conditional variance follows a
GARCH process as in (5.1.2). The conditional variance, hf the proxy for uncertainty, is
the one period ahead forecast variance based on the past information. It is a function o f
three terms: the mean level o f volatility a 0, the ARCH term50s 2_i and the GARCH
term hf_r 51
To generate measures o f uncertainty, monthly real exchange rates for each o f the
countries were used. Before estimation o f our ARCH/GARCH models, we conducted
some preliminary data analysis such as checking for the presence o f unit roots. The
results from the Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) Test for unit roots suggest that the log

50 The ARCH term is the lag o f squared errors from the mean equation or news about volatility from the
previous period.
51 To ensure a well-defined process, all the parameters in the infinite order AR representation must lie

outside the unit circle. For a GARCH (1,1) process this will be the case if a x and 5, are non-negative. It is
also required that

OCl+S1 < 1 for covariance stationarity.
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o f the real exchange rates for all the countries under consideration are 1(1) processes.
That is, the real exchange rate for each country has a unit root in levels while they are
difference stationary. As a result, to ensure the stationarity o f our variables, we use the
first differences to fit ARCH/GARCH models and to generate the conditional variances.
Table 3.2 presents the coefficients o f the GARCH (p, q) estimation. As can be
seen from Table 3.2, the coefficients o f the GARCH (p, q) have the expected theoretical
signs. Figure 3.1 shows a plot o f exchange rate uncertainty (ht ) for each country in our
study. Once the monthly exchange rate uncertainty measures ( ht ) are obtained, they are
aggregated to produce annual series, and included into our regressions.
3.4.2 Estimation Methodology and Results fo r the Determinants o f Remittances
In this paper, given the fact that we analyze the net flow o f remittances from the
U.S. to the 9 home countries, we employ panel data techniques that take into account
country-specific effects. Fixed or random effects panel data models take the countryspecific heterogeneities o f these countries into account. The fixed effect estimation
includes the country-specific effects as regressors rather than assigning them to the error
term, thereby reducing omitted variable bias. Fixed effects models always give consistent
results but they may not be efficient. Random effects models give a more efficient
estimator but might not be consistent if the true model is a fixed effect model. Therefore
we use the Hausman (1978) test to determine whether a fixed effect model or a random
effect model is more appropriate. In our case, the Hausman test confirmed the use o f a
fixed effects model.
In this study, we have two model specifications. The first model specification
employs remittances per immigrant as the dependent variable. However, several studies

95

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

argue for the importance o f including the stock o f immigrants as a determinant o f
remittances. Therefore, the second model specification uses remittances per GDP as the
dependent variable and the stock o f immigrants is included as one o f the independent
variables. All the variables included are in real terms therefore we do not include the
home and host country inflation rates. The inflation rates o f the home and host countries
are included m the real exchange rate variable.

The fixed effects models are as follows:
REM it =J3(I + A M H Iit + j32Y it + & GARCH it + & R R it + & X R it + j36POLRISKit + s it
REMFit = fi0 + AMHIit +/?2Yk +AGARCH it + /?4RRit + /?sXRit + &POLRISK + frlM M I+ e,
where, J30 is the country specific fixed-effect.
Tables 3.3 and 3.4 show the fixed effects estimation results with robust standard
errors. Table 3.3 displays results for model specification 1 (i.e. using the remittances per
immigrant as the dependent variable). Table 3.4 presents results for model specification 2
(i.e. employing the remittances per GDP as the dependent variable).
The results presented in both tables 3.3 and 3.4 show that all o f the variables have
their expected signs. From Table 3.3 it can be seen that the coefficient for the median
Hispanic income (MHI) is positive and significant implying that when the income o f
migrants in the U.S. increase they are more likely to increase the remittances they send to
52

However, we would also like to investigate the impacts of (both the home and host country’s) inflation rates on
remittances. Therefore we conducted a third set of estimations where we use the nominal variables so that we can
include the inflation rates of the home and host countries. The results are not reported here (but are available upon
request). The inflation rate of the home country has a negative coefficient but is not significant. The negative
coefficient is to be expected since if investment is the main motive to remit, the effect of the home country inflation on
remittances would be negative. This is because an increase in inflation in the home country would increase the relative
prices of goods and assets in the home country. On the other hand, inflation in the host country will increase the flow of
remittances as immigrant workers seek to protect against the erosion of purchasing power in the host country (Higgins
et al, 2004). Therefore, a positive relationship between host country inflation and remittances is to be expected. Our
results show that there is no significant relationship between these variables even though the coefficient has the
expected positive sign.
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their home countries. This result is supportive o f previous studies that show remittances
respond directly to the ability o f the remitter to send earnings home (Loser et al, 2006).
For comparison with other studies, we used the U.S. GDP as well as U.S. unemployment
rate to measure the economic well being o f migrants in the U.S. The results, though not
significant, show that U.S. unemployment is negatively related to remittances inflows
into Latin American countries. This is supportive o f previous studies such as Higgins et
al (2004) that show that a 1% rise in the US unemployment rate reduces remittances by
8%. The opposite result is found for the relationship between U.S. GDP and remittances
flows to Latin American countries.
Similarly, the estimated coefficient o f the GDP per capita o f the home countries
indicates that this variable is significantly and positively related to remittances. This
result suggests that the decision to remit is driven more by investment motives rather than
altruistic motives; supporting the self-interest and investment hypotheses (for similar
results, see Higgins et al, 2004 and Lucas and Stark, 1985). Another result that points
towards the self-interest (investment) motive to remit is the coefficient o f the rate o f
return to investment (RR). As can be seen from tables 3.3 and 3.4, the rate o f return to
investment is found to positively and significantly affect remittances inflows into the
selected Latin American countries. This result is to be expected if the motive to remit is
investment. A high rate o f return to investment would encourage more investment which
in turn would increase remittances for investment purposes. The coefficient for the real
exchange rate (XR) is not significant but always negative, indicating that remittances
tend to increase when the exchange rate depreciates (declines). This result shows that
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remitters choose to invest more in their home country when the currency o f their home
country depreciates (Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo (2004); and Wahba, 1991).
One o f the main variables o f interest, namely, the exchange rate uncertainty
(GARCH) is negative and significant. This result indicates that as exchange rate volatility
increases, the level o f remittances per immigrant decreases. The result supports the
hypothesis that more uncertainty in the exchange rate lowers the level o f remittances sent
for investment purposes (for similar results see Higgins et al, 2004). The migrant will
ignore better business opportunities in the home country if it expects a high variability o f
the exchange rate. Similarly, the political risk (POLRISK) is found to be negatively
related to remittances inflows. This result is also to be expected because political risk
creates an additional cost to investors and as a result one would expect a negative
relationship with remittances sent for investment purposes.
Table 3.4 shows results from model specification 2, where we use the immigrant
per GDP as the dependent variable. Results remain similar to results from model
specification 1 in that all the significant variables have the expected signs. The
coefficients for MHI, Y, and RR, are all positive while GARCH and POLRISK all have
negative coefficients. The new additional variable, namely the stock o f immigrants
(IMMI) in the host country has a positive relationship with remittances flows. This result
is expected since an increase in the number o f immigrants in the host country would
increase the money sent back home.
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3.5 CONCLUDING REMARKS
Latin American countries are the largest remittances destination in the world. By
2005, remittances inflows exceeded the combined flows o f all net Foreign Direct
Investment (FDI) and Official Development Assistance (ODA) to the Region (Inter
American Development Bank, 2006). Because o f their increasing volume and their
potential to reduce poverty, remittances are and should be receiving growing attention
from policymakers in the developing countries o f Latin American. There is a wide range
o f important issues related to remittances. In this study, we focus on investigating the
macroeconomic determinants o f remittances to 9 Latin American countries.
The empirical evidence from this paper shows that for the period o f 1986-2005,
macroeconomic variables o f the host as well as home countries affected remittances
inflows. Host country variables such as median Hispanic income in the U.S. significantly
affected remittances inflows. In addition, the results show that home country variables
such as rate o f return to investment, exchange rate uncertainty, and political risk are
important determinants o f remittances to Latin American countries. Based on the findings
o f this paper, we can say that governments o f the home countries can influence the inflow
o f remittances by the stabilizing their currency and by improving their institutional and
political environments.
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Table 3.1-- Remittances (for 2005) Relative to Official Development
Assistance, Foreign Direct Investment, and GDP
Country
Argentina
Bolivia
Brazil
Colombia
Mexico
Nicaragua
Peru
Venezuela

Remi % ODA
296%
55%
1973%
758%
13722%
366%
279%
533%

Remi % FDI
15%
835%
46%
111%
178%
270%
117%
18%

Remi % GDP
0.40%
8.50%
1 .1 0 %
4.10%
28.00%
16.90%
3.20%
0 .2 0 %

Source: Inter American Development Bank (2006)
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Figure 3.1 - Conditional Variances of the Exchange Rates
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Figure 3.1 -- Continued
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Table 3.2 —ARCH/GARCH Models of the Log Difference of Exchange Rates
_____________________________ (Monthly)______________________________

Countries

AR
Process

MA
Process

Argentina

AR( 8 )

MA(2)

Bolivia

AR(1)

MA(1)

Brazil

AR(3)

-

Colombia

AR(3)

-

Chile

AR(3)

-

Mexico

AR(3)

--

Nicaragua

AR(3)

--

Peru

AR(3)

--

Venezuela

AR(3)

--

«/
0.0207
(0.0003)***
0.0005
( 0 .0 0 1 0 )
0.0182
(0.0082)***
0 .0 0 0 2

(0.0028)***
0.0008
(0.0008)
0.1900
(0.0035)***
0 .0 1 0 0

(0.0016)***
0 .0 1 0 0

(0.0005)***
0.0347
10.00701***

a2

1.8723
(0.1806)***
0.4171
(0.1041)***
0.4123
(0.1268)***
1.3555
(0.1381)***
0.1863
(0.4855)***
0.2592
(0.0385)***
0.0939
(0.0191)***
0.4452
(0.0584)***
1.8067
10.44931***
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0.3618
(0.0805)***

0.0957
(0.1449)***
0.5799
(0.0514)***
0.9023
(0.0083)***
0.7181
(0.0119)***

Table 3.3 —Fixed Effects Estimation Results Using Remittances per Immigrant
Dependent Variable: Remittances per Immigrant
Variable

(1 )

Uncertainty (GARCH)

0.00674
(0.0030)***
-0.0242
(0.1543)
2.9449
(1.5481)***
2.7424
(1.5647)***
-6.9687
( 3 ,4 4 4 9 )***

Political Risk (POLRISK)

-0.0744
(0.0321)***

Median Hispanic Income (MHI)
Exchange Rates (XR)
GDP per capita (Y)
Rate o f Return to Investment (RR)

Immigrant Stock (IMMI)
Observations
Countries
R Squared within

_
180
9
0.5573

Notes:
Standard Errors are in parenthesis and ***, ** and * denote
significance at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels respectively
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Table 3.4 —Fixed Effects Estimation Results Using Remittances per
Dependent Variable: Remittances per GDP
Variable
Median Hispanic Income (MHI)
Exchange Rates (XR)
GDP per capita (Y)
Rate o f Return to Investment (RR)
Uncertainty (GARCH)
Political Risk (POLRISK)
Immigrant Stock (IMMI)
Observations
Countries
R Squared within

(1)
0.0048
(0.0028)***
-0.0825
(0.1417)
10.5056
(1.9564)***
12.2708
(2.0995)***
-0.6785
(0.3514)***
-0.1136
(0.0304)***
6.3523
(3.1663)***
180
9
0.7470

Notes:
Standard Errors are in parenthesis and ***, ** and * denote
significance at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels respectively
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IV. CONCLUSIONS AND FINAL REMARKS
This dissertation has focused on the two most important and most stable sources
o f foreign exchange to developing countries, namely FDI and remittances. It examined
the roles o f macroeconomic uncertainty and political risk in affecting FDI and
remittances flows into developing economies. In addition, a cross-region comparison was
conducted in order to assess to what degree each region is being affected by uncertainty
and risk.
The past few decades have witnessed a surge o f FDI inflows to developing
regions. However, FDI inflows to Africa still remain small when compared to other
developing regions. FDI has a potentially paramount significance to African countries
since most countries in Africa are characterized with low domestic savings and do not
have access to international capital markets. In addition, official loans and foreign
assistance per capita to the region have decreased. These important facts have increased
the significance o f FDI to Africa to achieve the Millennium Development Goal (MDG)
o f halving its proportion o f people that live in extreme poverty by 2015. Due to these
potential benefits o f FDI, it is important to investigate what has deterred FDI inflows to
African economies.
Investor surveys show political risk (arising from political instability and
inefficient institutions) and macroeconomic uncertainty (such as exchange rate
uncertainty) to be strong deterrents o f FDI inflows to Africa. Nevertheless, with regards
to the impact o f macroeconomic uncertainty and political risk on FDI inflows into Africa,
empirical research is very limited. As a result, the first essay used a sample o f 12 African
countries, and employed Fixed Effect and Arellano-Bond GMM estimators to investigate
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the impact o f exchange uncertainty and political risk on FDI inflows into African
economies. Exchange rate uncertainty consistently exhibited negative and significant
coefficients implying that it is a deterrent o f FDI inflows to African economies. The
coefficient for the political risk index was similarly negative and significant implying that
political risk discourages FDI inflows into these economies. Results across specifications
point to the fact that implementing stable macroeconomic policies and adopting an
investor friendly regulatory framework; for instance, removing restrictions on trade and
profit repatriation may significantly increase FDI inflows into these economies. In
addition, these African economies can increase FDI inflows by improving their
institutional and political environment thereby reducing the political risk associated with
investing in their countries. These results are supportive o f the predictions o f the
theoretical model presented.
The second essay is concerned with the unbalanced FDI inflow patterns across
developing regions. Why do FDI patterns differ so much across these regions? In addition
to the traditional determinants o f FDI such as infrastructure development, market size or
labor force availability and quality; do political risk and exchange rate uncertainty as well
as the strength o f institutions play a role in determining these patterns? In order to assess
strategies for the attraction o f FDI, it is important to investigate if the economic, political
as well as institutional uncertainties play an important role in impeding or facilitating FDI
inflows in these regions. As a result, the second chapter o f this dissertation employed data
on FDI inflows and remittances into Africa, Asia and Latin America to conduct a cross
region comparison in order to assess to what degree each region is being affected by
uncertainty and risk.
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Parametric as well as semiparametric results showed that risk affects FDI into
Africa more severely than other developing regions. Results also illustrated that African
countries receive less FDI compared to other developing countries even after controlling
for important determinants o f FDI. These results point to the fact that African countries
might be perceived to be overly risky. Therefore, these countries should improve their
institutional and political environment thereby reducing the political risk associated with
investing in their countries. Moreover, African countries could attempt to change their
perception o f being risky by publicizing the positive information about their countries.
The third essay focuses on remittances which are becoming an increasingly
important and highly stable source o f external finance for many developing countries
(Ratha, 2003). In 2005, the share o f developing countries in global remittances inflows
was $167 billion which had more than doubled from its value o f $58 billion in 1995 (UN
habitat, 2006). Out o f the $167 billion, $53.6 billion were sent to Latin America (Inter
American Development Bank, 2006). Therefore this essay focuses on Latin American
countries which are the largest remittances destination in the world.
By 2005 remittances inflows exceeded the combined flows o f all net Foreign
Direct Investment (FDI) and Official Development Assistance (ODA) to the Region o f
Latin America (Inter American Development Bank, 2006). Because o f their increasing
volume and their potential to reduce poverty, remittances are and should be receiving
growing attention from policymakers in Latin American countries. Therefore, this study
investigated the macroeconomic determinants o f remittances to 9 Latin American
countries.
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The empirical evidence from the third essay showed that for the period o f 19862005, variables such as exchange rate uncertainty and political risk were important
determinants o f remittances into Latin American countries. The rate o f return to
investment and the GDP per capita o f the remittances receiving countries were also found
to be significant implying that remittances are motivated by investment reasons.
Therefore based on these results, we can say that governments o f the remittances
receiving countries can influence the inflow o f remittances for investment by means o f
adopting improved investing conditions and stabilizing their political environments.
Based on the findings o f this dissertation, for a significant flow o f long term
foreign capital; a stable economic, institutional, and political environment is needed.
Even though economic uncertainty cannot be totally eliminated, it could be minimized.
The conclusions o f this study therefore indicate that stabilization o f currency should be
attained as a measure to encourage FDI and remittances flows.
In addition, it is important to implement a stable political and institutional
environment. In fact, in the past decade, most developing countries in Africa and Latin
America have managed to improve their political as well as institutional situations. A
Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) study by the World Bank Institute and World
Bank Development Economics Vice-presidency shows that several countries in Africa
and Latin America including Sierra Leone, Tanzania, Rwanda, and Venezuela have made
significant progress in improving governance over the past decade. It is therefore
important for developing countries to change their perception o f being risky by
publicizing this type o f positive information about their countries.
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